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A.        AREA OF RESEARCH 
How can the Swedish Defense Industry fulfill the needs of the Swedish Armed 
Forces and stay competitive in a rapidly changing market place? This thesis investigates 
alternative strategies for the Swedish Defense Industry to stay competitive in the new market 
conditions which prevail following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of 
the cold war. An investigation of likely international and domestic defense market 
development over the next ten years will form the background for the analysis, which will 
compare alternative industry-initiated strategies. Recognition of the tightly coupled 
relationships among Swedish foreign, defense, and industrial policies are essential to the 
investigation. 
The Swedish government determines the size of the Armed Forces, by far the largest 
and most important customer for the defense industry. Due to that fact, the view of the 
Swedish government regarding future threat and defense spending levels, as well as foreign 
dependence, will be presented. Consequently, evaluation criteria derived from the Swedish 
military needs will be used as the basis for the comparison between alternative defense 
industry strategies. To get a broader view, other scenarios which consider possible 
geopolitical developments will be investigated. The final selection of evaluation criteria will 
be based on government and Armed Forces priorities. 
The purpose of the research is to present and compare different strategies available 
to the Swedish Defense Industry, in order to fulfill the needs of the Swedish Armed Forces 
and stay competitive in the future, despite proposed lower defense spending in Sweden and 
a shrinking world market. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The study is based on the following assumptions and limitations: 
• Present government policy proposals will go into effect. 
• Government intervention or subsidies will not be considered. 
• The primary industry role will remain the same - supply the Swedish Armed 
Forces. 
• The time frame for the study is the next ten years. 
The study will not focus on details, or propose solutions for each and every firm. 
Instead it will analyze different general strategies in order to find a measure, or a mix of 
measures, that can be helpful to the defense industry. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary question this research addresses is: 
• To what degree do alternative strategies, available to the Swedish Defense 
Industry, fulfill the future needs of the Swedish Armed Forces, and by doing so 
help the industry to sustain its competitiveness in a shrinking market 
environment? 
To answer the primary question, it will be necessary to address the following 
subsidiary questions: 
• Why does Sweden, a small neutral country, have a defense industry? 
• What is the current state of the Swedish Defense Industry? 
• What is likely to happen to the defense market, especially the domestic market? 
• How will the changing market effect the Swedish Defense Industry? 
• What are Swedish government intentions for defense policy? 
• Which are the Swedish Armed Forces' future needs? 
• Which industry-initiated strategies are available? 
• How well do the strategies fulfill the needs? 
• Which solution set is preferable given likely developments? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
To describe and analyze current and future trends for defense industries in Sweden 
and worldwide, as well as Swedish security policy, this research makes use of industry 
literature, trade publications, U.S. and Swedish government sources, and professional 
publications. Specific background information is provided by studies conducted by the 
Swedish defense industry itself, the Swedish government, and Armed Forces headquarters. 
Current events as described in Defense News, Jane's Defence Weekly, Aviation Week 
and Space Technology, among others, are investigated and used in the research. In addition, 
the researcher has participated in the annual preparations for white papers to the Swedish 
Government regarding defense policy and the development of the Swedish Armed Forces. 
Unclassified background material and notes from this work have also been used. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
This research is organized to initially give a background to, and a picture of, the 
Swedish Defense Industry. It will then present a number of trends regarding arms trade and 
defense industries worldwide. In the next part the Swedish government's proposal for the 
next defense decision will be presented, together with the Armed Forces' view, serving as 
the basis for how the largest and most important customer and the environment will develop 
in the next five to ten years. Finally different alternatives will be presented, compared and 
analyzed using evaluation criteria derived from the "reality" presented earlier. 
Chapter I presents the study. Chapter II and III give a background to why Sweden 
built a defense industry in the first place, and the current structure and capability of today. 
Chapter IV looks into today's global marketplace in terms of what is going on, which 
trends can be seen. Excess capacity, globalization, restructuring, new competitors, new 
pricing policies and offset will be discussed. 
Chapter V will initially give an overview of the Swedish Armed Forces, the current 
Swedish government's view, and the corresponding defense policy. Following this, the 
Armed Forces' view regarding the Swedish Defense Industry and its importance to the 
Armed Forces will be examined. Since it is obvious in all scenarios that foreign dependence 
is an important issue, and will be even more so in the future, it will also be addressed. 
Finally, the government committee's proposed defense policy for the coming five years in 
view of the new security situation and its implications, will be presented. 
Chapter VI will look into some available responses and strategies of companies 
involved in production of military systems. Three different strategies, synthesized from the 
prevailing trends, will be presented and discussed as possible approaches to the new 
environment. To exemplify, recent developments will also be presented as well as pros and 
cons for each alternative. 
Chapter VII compares the different strategies presented in Chapter VI. The strategies 
will be compared by using selection criteria derived from the Swedish needs in the future, 
and they will be graded on how well they fulfill those demands. As a consequence of the 
method chosen, the study will not be able to predict which of the strategies that will be most 
successful in the marketplace. But it will show to what degree they fulfill the demands from 
the Swedish government and Armed Forces. And since the defense industry also in the 
future will be dependent on the domestic market, it is reasonable that the result also gives an 
indication on the possibilities for success in the marketplace. 
Chapter VIII discusses the findings, draws conclusions and proposes a strategy for 
the Swedish Defense Industry. 

II. BACKGROUND 
The Swedish defense industry has a long experience in designing and manufacturing 
armaments - for some companies more than 300 years. The current structure and coverage, 
however, dates from World War II when Sweden established its independence from foreign 
supply sources. Since then the defense industry has been a mainstay of Sweden's security 
policy.1 This chapter will present some of the most important reasons for why Sweden today 
has a broad and competitive defense industry. 
A.       REASONS FOR A SWEDISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY BASE 
The base of the Swedish defense industry is broad. There are only a handful of 
countries, including Sweden, that have the ability to design, develop and manufacture 
advanced weapon systems capable of fulfilling the strict requirements of the Army, Navy and 
Air Force. Why has Sweden, a small country with limited resources, built this industrial 
capability? Some reasons are suggested in the following discussion. 
1. Non-aligned Policy 
For decades Sweden has occupied a strategically important role in northern Europe, 
sandwiched between the two superpowers. That fact, together with Sweden's wartime 
neutrality and peacetime non-alliance policies, placed great demands on defense capabilities. 
In order to give credibility to the policy of neutrality, it was considered important to 
demonstrate a strong will for independence from the two blocks.2 
2. World War II 
When the dark clouds began to gather over Europe in the 1930's, Sweden had a need 
to rebuild its defense capability. To do so with domestic sources was impossible, mostly due 
to an inadequate infrastructure. Furthermore, the expertise was not high enough in many 
areas. 
An attempt to fulfill the military needs through import proved unsuccessful, since 
potential exporters were mobilizing for war, and kept their best equipment for domestic 
purposes. Thus, the only equipment available to Sweden was both expensive and outdated. 
Due to this experience of scarcity, the ability to develop, manufacture and support weapons 
systems domestically became necessary. 
3. Unique Requirements 
Sweden has unique requirements due to geography, climate, and the conscript system. 
Consequently, Swedish defense philosophy is in certain areas different from most other 
countries. The Air Force, for example, disperses the squadrons on bases using normal roads 
prepared in peacetime. This calls for special requirements on the systems. Fighter aircraft 
have to be able to land on an 800 meter runway. A domestic defense industry has the ability 
to tailor weapons systems to Sweden's unique circumstances from the beginning of the 
Research & Development (R&D) process. 
4. Access to Technology 
To gain access to first-rate technology that other countries are unwilling to export 
without restriction (e.g., electronic warfare equipment, sensors, encryption equipment), both 
military and government authorities believed it necessary to domestically build up and 
maintain capability in the restricted technologies. 
B.        SUMMARY 
A domestic defense industry is able to support the Armed Forces in peacetime, crisis 
and war, reducing the nation's vulnerability to blockades or political pressure. This is 
especially important since Sweden is non-aligned, and to a large degree must rely on its own 
capacity in a time of crisis. The structure of the Swedish Armed Forces relies on a 
nationwide mobilization system which requires a complex, multi-tiered, pre-positioned 
infrastructure to support flexible response. The domestic industrial infrastructure must be 
capable of supplying the combination of pre-positioned and rapidly produced material 
necessary to respond to a variety of situations. 
REFERENCES 
1. Association of Swedish Defence Industries, The Swedish Defence Industry, 1994, 
p. 4 
2. Association of Swedish Defence Industries, The Swedish Defence Industry, 1994, 
p. 3 
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III. THE SWEDISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY TODAY 
A.        STRUCTURE 
This chapter will present the Swedish Defense Industry both in terms of structure and 
capability. The current structure of the Swedish Defense Industry is shown in Figure 1. 
Ericsson 
































































Figure 1. Structure of Swedish Defense Industry.1 
The Swedish Defense Industry today consists of three major groups of companies: 
Ericsson, Celsius, and SAAB. In addition to these three, there is Hagglunds Vehicle AB, a 
company within Incentive AB. Hagglunds Vehicle owns Barracuda Technologies. Akers 
Krutbruk Protection AB is a company standing outside any groups of companies. In the 
following, the companies' specialities and their origin will be described. 
1. Ericsson AB 
The Ericsson group has one company manufacturing defense products: Ericsson 
Microwave Systems AB. The company was formed by a merger between Ericsson Radio 
System AB and Ericsson Radar Electronics AB, on January 1,1995. The core of Ericsson 
Microwave Systems AB's business is in the fields of sensors, communication and electronic 
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warfare equipment. The company creates complete systems of the components within each 
of those different fields of speciality. 
The company's new name also indicates an increasing civil aim, based on its 
knowledge in high frequency and microwave technique. The number of employees is 2,100. 
2. Celsius AB 
Celsius Industrier AB and Celsius Information Systems AB are the two companies 
that make up Celsius AB. Celsius Industrier AB consists of Bofors AB, Kockums AB, FFV 
Aerotech and Celsius Tech. Under Celsius Information Systems there is TELUB. 
a. Bofors AB 
The company develops and produces a wide range of defense systems and 
has, with its subcompanies, qualifications in the following areas: 
• Missiles, especially ground to air- and anti-tank missiles (Bofors Missiles). 
• Guns, combat vehicles and munitions (Bofors Weapon System). 
• Munitions, small arms ammunition and portable anti-tank weapons (Bofors Carl 
Gustaf). 
• Powder and explosives (Bofors Explosives AB). 
• Torpedoes and mines (Bofors Underwater Systems AB). 
The number of employees is 3,000. 
b. Kockums AB 
Kockums has two subcompanies: Kockums Submarine and Karlskronavarvet. 
The company develops and produces mainly naval systems. Currently, the following 
products are manufactured: 
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• Submarines (The Gotland series), 
• Missile ships, 
• Mine-clearing vessels, 
• Surface warfare ships and Army bridges. 
There are 1,500 employees of which 800 are employed by Karskronavarvet. 
c. Celsius Tech AB 
Celsius Tech Systems and Celsius Tech Electronics are the two companies 
that constitute Celsius Tech AB. Celsius Tech Systems develops and manufactures combat 
and fire control systems for ships, ground based command and control systems for air 
defense, communication systems, and systems for air traffic control. 
Celsius Tech Electronics develops and manufactures products for all branches 
in the areas of electronic warfare, avionics, telecommunications, fire control and optics, and 
airplane radio and microwave products. Celsius Tech AB has 2,000 employees. 
d. TELUB 
TELUB is a part of the Celsius group. Its business idea is to offer services 
from a non-manufacturer's point of view concerning efficiency in the customer's technical 
functions and systems. TELUB offers the following services: 
• Technical support and documentation related to procurement, support and 
maintenance. 
• Facility services. 
• Maintenance and modification operations. 
TELUB has 1,400 employees. 
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e. FFV Aerotech 
FFV Aerotech is a maintenance and technical support company within the 
Celsius group. Its field is mainly concerned with military aircraft. The enterprise consists of: 
• Hardware maintenance and maintenance modifications on aircraft systems and 
missiles. 
• Technical services within maintenance/support. 
• Speciality manufacturing, maintenance/support, spare parts production. 
• Modifications and systems upgrading. 
The number of employees is 1,400. 
3.        SAAB AB 
The defense related company in the SAAB group is SAAB Defence. SAAB Defence 
has the subcompanies SAAB Military Aircraft, SAAB Dynamics, and SAAB Training 
Systems AB. SAAB Military Aircraft's largest business today concerns the development and 
manufacturing of the JAS 39 Gripen. The company has 2,800 employees. 
SAAB Dynamics develops and manufactures products for all defense branches. 
Examples of products are: 
• Navy missile systems and sub-systems for certain air-to-air missile programs. 
• Electro optical fire control systems. 
• Reconnaissance systems. 
• Counter measure systems. 
• Sights. 
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• Navigating systems for submarines. 
• Laser firing simulators. 
• Artillery simulators. 
• Target material. 
The company has 800 employees. 
4. Hagglunds Vehicle AB 
Hagglunds Vehicle AB develops and produces all-terrain vehicles and armored 
vehicles. The products are: 
• All-terrain vehicles in several varieties. 
• Combat vehicle 90, plus chassis renovation and modification of older combat 
vehicles. 
• License manufacturing of the Leopard 2 tank. 
The number of employees is 700. 
5. Volvo Aero Corporation 
Volvo Aero Corporation maintains and supports aircraft engines mainly through its 
subcompany Volvo Aero Support, both for military and civilian use. In addition, the engine 
for the JAS 39 Gripen is manufactured by VAC, under license from General Electric. 
The number of employees is 1,100 in the defense sector. 
6. Akers Krutbruk Protection AB 
Akers krutbruk develops and manufactures light armor for combat vehicles. In 
addition, it manufactures protection gear for soldiers, such as bullet proof vests and helmets. 
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B.        BASIC FACTS 
The Swedish Defense Industry is considered to be surprisingly strong and 
internationally competitive in research, development and production, especially for a country 
of small size. Also, Sweden claims to have unique "system builder" competence in a number 
of areas. A description of the basic facts follows: 
1. Capital Turnover 
The total value of materiel supplied by the defense industry in 1993 was 
approximately two billion U.S. Dollars (USD) of which 70% was for equipment to the 
Swedish Armed Forces.2 
2. Exports 
Thirty to forty percent of items produced are exported. The Swedish legislation 
regarding arms exports are very strict, limiting exports. The potential for export is most 
likely higher. 
3. Manpower 
The total number employed amounts to 24,000. The number of employees with 
higher technical qualifications is approximately 18% of the total. In recent years, the 
Swedish defense industry, including subcontractors, has fully employed some 40,000 
persons, about 10% of all those employed in engineering.3 
4. Market Share 
The domestic industry is normally awarded approximately 70% of the Swedish 




Most of the defense industries have monopoly in their "field". Sweden can not afford 
domestic competition any longer. There are only a few areas, such as electronics and 
vehicles, where domestic competition still exists. It is only in those areas where Sweden has 
a successful and competitive civilian industry, and where the defense portion of the industry 
is small, that this domestic competition is possible. So, in order to get competitive bids for 
defense contracts, foreign alternatives are encouraged. Recent examples are main battle 
tanks and attack helicopters. In cases where a foreign supplier is preferred, extensive trials 
are held in the country before a decision is made. 
6. Capabilities 
The industry has development and production capacity in most areas. The exceptions 
are large transport aircraft, helicopters, military space systems and air-to-air missiles. 
C. FOREIGN DEPENDENCE 
The defense industry has foreign dependence, both in components and subsystems. 
The degree of dependence is not determined, but 30% is probably a good approximation. 
There has been no attempt to clarify all dependencies in detail, but the trend is toward an 
increasing number of foreign subcontractors and suppliers. 
D. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
The Armed Forces have encouraged the defense industry to reduce costs for new 
systems through international cooperation. Current cooperation agreements involving 
foreign defense industries are found in the areas of: 
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• Intelligent Ammunition 
• Missile Systems 
• Submarines 
• Advanced Fighter Aircraft 
• ECM Systems 
• Mine Systems 
• Artillery Locating Radar 
• Aircraft Engines 
• Combat Vehicles4 
E.        FACTS ABOUT MILITARY R&D IN SWEDEN 
Total spending is approximately 600 million USD. The funding goes mainly to the 
Defense Research Administration (FOA), the Defense Materiel Administration (FMV), the 
defense industry and universities. One third can be considered as basic research, and two 
thirds as system development. 
The Air Force dominates R&D, accounting for 70% of the total budget. This is 
mainly due to the ongoing JAS multi-role fighter project. (JAS is a Swedish acronym 
designating fighter, attack, and reconnaissance roles.) It includes not only the airframe, but 
also development of sensors, communication equipment, electronic warfare equipment and 
other components. 
Spending from the government accounts for 70% of the total R&D budget, and 30% 
is internal financing by the industry itself.  The trend today is that the R&D part of the 
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defense budget is increasing. This is partly because R&D costs are rising, but also that 
systems get more and more technology intensive. The most obvious example is electronics, 
where R&D spending has increased more than 100% since 1985.5 
There are clear signs that more R&D is conducted in cooperation between different 
industries. To remain competitive, firms specialize in one specific area or subcomponent, 
then seek partnership with other firms to build whole systems. 
REFERENCES 
1. Provided by the Defense Material Administration 
2. Association of Swedish Defence Industries, The Swedish Defence Industry, 1994, 
P-7 
3. Association of Swedish Defence Industries, The Swedish Defence Industry, 1994, 
P-7 
4. Association of Swedish Defence Industries, The Swedish Defence Industry, 1994, 
p. 17 
5. Provided by the Defense Material Administration 
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IV. ARMS PRODUCTION AND TRADE - GENERAL TRENDS 
This chapter will present the prevailing trends in the arms market today, and discuss 
some of the implications the trends mentioned may have for the defense industry in general, 
and for the development and production of weapons systems. 
A.   BACKGROUND 
One of the most significant effects the fall of the Soviet Union and the break-up of 
the Warsaw Pact has had is reduced defense spending world wide. With few exceptions, 
most countries have reconsidered the costs for their defense, and have taken the end of the 
cold war as an excuse for substantial cuts in defense spending. Tensions between countries 
in different parts of the world have also led to some governments restricting or banning arms 
export to countries in that region. This has resulted in lower demand for the defense 
industries' products, both by smaller defense budgets domestically and reduced export 
possibilities. 
At the same time, the cost for R&D and manufacturing of weapons systems has 
increased significantly during the last decade. It is especially the fixed costs and the R&D 
share that have increased. An American study has shown increases in real terms between 6 
and 13 % per year. The cost may increase as much as 200 to 400 % for every new generation 
of weapons.1 
Since development cost is such a big part of the total cost, it is important for the 
defense industry to have long production runs. A company or country that can produce long 
series gets the benefit of lower development costs per unit and will as a result be able to 
offer lower prices. 
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Earlier, increased defense budgets have been able to somewhat offset the rising costs. 
Since the late 1980s, this has not been the case. This, plus the shrinking market, has made 
the problems related to economies of scale more and more accentuated. A reinforcing loop 
can describe this process: lower budgets, less demand, fewer produced, higher cost per unit, 
less demand, fewer produced. 
What is mentioned so far is related to economics, but there are also political 
problems. One example that has been visible is the lack of political and operational 
coordination inside NATO. There have been attempts to restructure the acquisition of new 
materiel, in order to be able to develop and produce systems jointly, but the main part is still 
developed and produced by the separate countries. This has led to a big number of different 
systems and standards, which in part makes joint operations more difficult. 
B.        EXCESS CAPACITY 
One obvious result of both lower defense budgets and more expensive systems is 
fewer orders. This is especially true for more complex systems as combat aircraft, missiles, 
naval vessels, tanks etc. Ordered numbers are declining, production rates are lower and the 
time between new systems is increasing. Another trend having negative impact on the 
defense industry output is that more emphasis is put into modification of older existing 
systems, increasing their life and capability as a means to save money.2 
This leads to more and more defense industries with excess capacity. In the absence 
of any offsetting action, a reduction in capacity is inevitable. A study presented in 1992 
estimated that approximately one fifth of worldwide defense related employment, three to 
four million jobs, could be lost by end of the 1990s. This study also shows that the export 
of major weapon systems fell by more than 50 % between 1987 and 1992, and is likely to 
continue to drop.3 
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This collapse in international arms trade is primarily due to the ending of the cold war 
and a resolution of several Third World conflicts. Also, the traditional arms exporters - the 
United States, Europe, and the former Soviet Union - must contend with an increasingly 
competitive global arms market, as new suppliers, particularly in the developing world, have 
emerged.4 
C.       GLOBALIZATION 
In nearly every country, arms production has traditionally been one of the most 
protected sectors of the national economy. Most countries prefer to be self-reliant in arms 
procurement and domestic defense industries have generally been perceived as the most 
secure source for defense equipment. Even in the "capitalistic" countries, weapons 
production was usually placed outside the bounds of free market economics. Competition, 
efficiency and profitability were secondary to guaranteeing the domestic resources needed 
for national defense.5 
In most cases, the defense industry has been dependent on these special conditions. 
The stable domestic market, supporting the development of new weapons systems both 
financially and technically, has been important. This is especially true for Sweden, where 
very strict rules regarding arms export have limited the potential number of export 
customers. 
Today a different trend is emerging. The defense industry is becoming less and less 
domestic. This trend is often described with the term "globalization". The term globalization 
is used as an umbrella for a lot of different activities. Some of the different activities falling 
into this category are: 
• Codevelopment: Transnational design, development, and (production) of weapons 
systems. 
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• Consortium: A formal but ad hoc industrial agreement to codevelop or coproduce. 
• Family of weapons: An international division of labor involving several related 
weapons systems, where participating countries separately develop a particular 
weapon within the group and then permit the other participants to produce that 
weapon for themselves. 
• Joint Venture: An international company jointly owned and operated by defense 
firms in two or more countries in order to codevelop or coproduce a weapon 
system.6 
Globalization implies that development and production of weapon systems is made, 
at least in part, outside a country's border, and in most cases in cooperation with other 
nations. This is a big change, and it seems obvious that this trend is going to have 
implications for a variety of national security issues, including security- and defense policy, 
arms control, regional security cooperation, and the future size, structure and capabilities of 
the domestic defense industrial base.7 
The reasons for globalization can be both military, political and as mentioned above, 
economical. The most commonly described are some of the following: 
• Sharing costs and by doing so reducing the risk of researching, developing, and 
manufacturing new weapon systems. 
• Gaining access to foreign technologies. 
• Helping to achieve economies of scale in the production of increasingly expensive 
weapon systems. 
• Developing and penetrating foreign markets that might otherwise be closed to 
arms imports. 
• Enhancing the combat efficiency and effectiveness of military alliances by 
eliminating wasteful duplication in arms production while promoting battlefield 
rationalization, standardization, and interoperability. 
24 
• Fostering other types of international cooperation, such as NATO political 
solidarity or European economic integration.8 
D. RESTRUCTURING 
All defense industries face major challenges over the rest of this decade, which will 
most certainly cause a need for restructuring. A move towards nonmilitary production is one 
option. Consolidation, concentration in core competencies and downsizing are other options 
available. These options can be used alone or together. 
Another trend that has been especially visible in Europe is the creation of almost 
monopoly suppliers through mergers and acquisitions. This can either be done to reduce the 
number of competitors, control important resources (a skilled workforce, technical 
competence, access to markets, capital and raw material, etc.) or take over customers. There 
are many examples where big British, French, German and American defense industries have 
bought other producers of defense systems in both Europe and the U.S. The total number 
of industries is reduced, and the power is becoming more concentrated to a few companies, 
often called National Champions. Some companies have decided to leave the defense market 
totally.   Philips, for example, sold all defense related companies a couple of years ago.9 
Strategic alliances, a loose industrial arrangement between defense industries in two 
or more countries, is also something that has emerged. 
E. NEW COMPETITION 
The countries in the Pacific Rim (China, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Singapore and Malaysia) currently constitute the only vibrant arms market in the world. But 
these countries are different from other former customers in the developing world. Their 
arms purchases are often accompanied by offset agreements involving technology transfer 
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from supplier to recipient, and by direct government investment in military research, 
development and production. 
Many of them are now producers of at least some military equipment, and they have 
also invested in the establishment of modern production facilities. As a result, these 
countries are becoming more and more self-sufficient in the production of weapon systems 
and, in some cases, beginning to enter the arms market as exporters. 
If this trend continues for another couple of years, some of these countries will be 
able not only to develop and produce weapon systems with substantial indigenous design, 
but also pose a serious threat to the established countries on the global arms market.10 
F.        OTHER MEASURES 
There are two other trends that also must be commented on. The first is that the 
increased competition forces the defense industries (or in some cases governments) to adopt 
new pricing policies, in order to get orders for their systems. Here is a recent example from 
Defense News: 
Pentagon officials seeking a competitive edge for U.S. weaponry sold abroad 
are exercising a loophole in U.S. law that requires research and development 
surcharges on military items sold through the government's foreign military 
sales (FMS) program. U.S. government and industry sources said the 
Pentagon's sale to Sweden of 100 AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range 
Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) marks the first use of a new export formula, 
where the missiles are sold via direct commercial contract administered by 
the U.S. Air Force. Because the AMRAAM sale is not technically part of the 
government's foreign military sales program, the contract to be signed later 
this year between the Swedish Air Force and U.S. missile makers Hughes 
Missile Systems Co. and Raytheon Co., will exclude surcharges estimated at 
114 000 USD per copy, or more than 25 percent of the missile's unit cost, 
government and industry sources said." 
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Finding a way to lower prices is probably a necessity that the U.S. defense industry 
is forced into by the tough competition its industry is facing in the world market. Removal 
of the surcharge makes AMRAAM cost-competitive with its French rival MICA, which was 
the other competitor for the Swedish order. These two missiles will probably be the main 
competitors for most of the countries that now are in the market for new air-to-air missiles. 
By removing the surcharge for R&D, the U.S. alternative becomes much more competitive. 
The other trend is to revaluate and relax current export restrictions regarding arms 
and defense related technologies. This is not something the defense industry itself can do, 
but it can put political pressure on the government in order to gain access to a closed market. 
The government may feel a such strong pressure, and see relaxed regulations as a quick and 
simple solution to some of the industries' problems, so they are ready to reevaluate earlier 
limitations. 
But it is important to remember that new export policies will have to balance the 
defense industries' economic concern against the countries' foreign policy goals such as 
arms control and nonproliferation. In this regard, some countries may find it necessary to 
keep the export restrictions on certain types of weapons and military technologies, and at the 
same time, remove other restrictions that damage the domestic defense industry. 
G.       OFFSET 
Defense related offset, or "compensation" in the form of license production, domestic 
production or guaranteed import of goods from the recipient country, is almost a rule in 
today's marketplace. The reasons for offset are both economical and political. 
One important factor behind a request for offset is the political process. In many 
democratic countries, there is often a debate between different factions before a decision is 
made. In order to gain support for a decision to buy a weapon system abroad, the government 
wants to point out other benefits from the deal.  Such benefits can be to license produce 
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domestically (creating jobs), subcontract portions to the domestic industry, or other goals 
related to industrial policy.12 
A buyer, primarily in the developed countries, normally has one or more of the 
following goals when demanding offset: 
• Build domestic capital 
• Restructuring the industrial base 
• Subsidize a region or an industry 
• Support its security policy 
• Gain political support for the deal '3 
Offset is often tied to one single project, but can be spread out over several years. 
Offset activities can be both related or unrelated to the imported system. These activities 
influence the defense industry in different ways: 
A percentage of the total ennobled value of the project should be produced in the 
recipient country. This often make parts of the defense industry in the recipient country 
subcontractors to the seller and can lead to abandonment of some of the normal 
subcontractors in the seller country. 
The seller may have to transfer technology, knowledge or capital to the recipient 
country. This usually involves the deiense industry in the recipient country, but not always. 
The transfer can also be unrelated to the imported system. As a rule, many countries want 
to gain the knowledge and technology to support the system themselves. 
The seller country may promise to buy products from the recipient country for a 
percentage of the system value. This can in some cases be considered as a "payment", and 
be totally unrelated to the imported system. The defense industry will not be affected by 
this.14 
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As a rule of thumb, offset is almost a must in today's marketplace. And it is up to the 
recipient to decide what for, and where to use it. 
H.       SWEDISH EXAMPLES 
This chapter has presented some of the prevailing trends in the arms market right 
now. Even Sweden has adopted some of the measures as the following examples will show. 
One Defense News example showing international cooperation is that the Gripen, a 
lightweight, multi-role combat aircraft developed for the Swedish Air Force, will be 
marketed worldwide by British Aerospace Ltd. British Aerospace and SAAB Military 
Aircraft will establish a small joint venture company to market the Gripen, and will 
undertake whatever work is required to adapt the basic Swedish Air Force design to the 
requirements of export customers.15 
Under the agreement, British Aerospace will also produce a percentage of the 
exported airframes, although the two companies have not yet decided where final assembly 
of export aircraft would be carried out. SAAB hopes that this agreement will lead to 
increased chances for export by benefiting from British Aerospace's world-wide marketing 
organization and expertise. 
One offset example is the Australian buy of Swedish submarines in 1987. (The 
Collins class). Kockums created a joint venture together with Australian companies and 
promised to produce the main parts of the submarines in Australia. They also promised to 
develop closer links between Swedish and Australian companies in the technology sector. 
Another more recent Defense News example, "The Swedish government ... and 
SAAB Aircraft AB are offering Hungary a 1 billion USD financial and industrial offset 
package to help Budapest acquire up to 60 of the company's JAS 39 Gripen light combat 
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aircraft..."'6 This example shows that defense industries, supported by governments, are 
prepared to go a long way to accommodate a potential customer's offset requirements. 
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V. GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES POLICY 
The previous chapters established a background for what the Swedish Defense 
Industry looks like today and the world market developments in this area. Now the specific 
Swedish environment will be examined. 
This chapter will initially give an overview of the Swedish Armed Forces and the 
Swedish government's present defense policy. Following this, the Armed Forces' views 
regarding the Swedish Defense Industry and its importance to the Armed Forces will be 
examined. The important issue of foreign dependence will also be addressed. Finally, the 
policy proposed by the multi-partisan government defense committee will be presented in 
the context of the new geopolitical environment. 
These factors and policies together constitute the domestic environment for the 
Swedish Armed Forces. To a large extent, due to the importance of the domestic market, the 
future of the Armed Forces sets the basis for the Swedish Defense Industry. (For the 
international environment - refer to Chapter IV) 
A.        THE SWEDISH ARMED FORCES TODAY 
The budget for the Swedish Armed Forces has been relatively constant (in relative 
prices) for the last 25 years but has declined as a percentage of GDP (See Figure 2). Since 
the wartime organization for most ofthat time remained large (800,000 men), while the cost 
of new systems increased, Sweden found itself in the late 1980s with a partly outdated 
organization formed to withstand a large-scale invasion. This development reflected 
investments in quantity rather than in quality. In the 1992 defense decision, the center-right 
coalition increased the defense budget slightly and encouraged the Armed Forces to move 
towards higher quality and less quantity. This decision gave military leaders more discretion. 
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Subsequently, they have invested heavily in new equipment. A reduced war time 
organization was adopted in an attempt to bring balance between tasks and resources. 
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Figure 2. The Budget for the Swedish Armed Forces. 
B. PRESENT DEFENSE POLICY 
Since the Social Democratic party was returned to power in 1994, they have used the 
new strategic situation as a lever to further downsize the Armed Forces. The government 
immediately ordered the Defense department to cut its SEK 40 billion budget by SEK 4 
billion over five years.2   Since then, the party has advocated the following defense agenda: 
• Accomplish further and earlier reductions in defense spending. A new defense 
decision (organization and budget) in 1996 instead of, as planned, in 1997. 
• Remain non-allied/neutral. Membership in either NATO or any other defense 
pact is not considered an option at this time. 
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• Maintain flexibility. Reduce the Armed Forces as a response to the current 
situation, but maintain ability for growth if necessary. 
• "Consolidate" in Scandinavia. If possible, a coordination of the acquisition 
programs between the Scandinavian countries should be sought. The government 
hopes that shared costs and longer production runs can help sustain some of the 
capabilities that otherwise would not survive. An agreement among Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway and Finland was signed in 1994. The purpose is to ensure 
cooperation in the areas of studies, research, development, production, 
maintenance and system acquisition. 
• Rely on more foreign cooperation. In line with all other high technology branches 
of the industry, the defense industry must increase its cooperation with foreign 
companies. Many new projects are so demanding, both technically and 
financially, that they tend to go beyond the resources of a single company or even 
a single nation. 
• Maintain a basic stand-alone capability in both R&D and production capacity in 
vital areas. 
• Concentrate efforts to recognize and sustain vital niches of defense technology. 
• Place more emphasis on civilian industry as a base for defense products. The idea 
is to improve the capability for rapid mobilization and obtain the lower costs 
derived from less rigorous specification and testing requirements. 
• Seek more dual use products and encourage defense conversions. 
The agenda has much in common with the former government agenda. Many of the 
proposed action items on the previous government agenda have been carried over. The 
primary differences are a smaller budget, further downsizing, and a consequent emphasis on 
the ability to "reconstitute" forces when necessary. 
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C.        GOVERNMENT POLICY REGARDING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Despite the constant defense budget in the 1970s and 1980s, the spending level was 
large enough to sustain a broad based domestic defense industry. Some large export orders 
during the world-wide military buildup during the 1980s helped postpone the inevitable 
restructuring. The restructuring has now started and the following excerpts from official 
documents (translated from Swedish) show the government's policy regarding the defense 
industry: 
The government suggests that the areas of domestic competence, with the 
highest importance for the defense forces, should be classified as basic 
competence requirements, defined as those areas in which domestic defense 
capability is extremely important. This basic competence can be located in 
the industry, inside defense agencies or in universities. In addition to this 
deeper basic competence, there is also a need for a broader knowledge base 
in the defense agencies, in order to be a knowledgeable customer. Basic 
competence ought to be maintained in the following areas: 
•Electronic Warfare Technology Including Sensors 
•Advanced Stealth Technology 
•Underwater Technology 
•Aircraft Technology 
•Support and Maintenance 
The government will conduct further studies regarding the requirement for 
munitions production capacity. 
It is essential that efforts in these areas are made for the long term and be cost 
effective. To obtain those goals, the defense forces should place orders for 
research, development and production of systems with the domestic industry. 
The armed forces ought to conduct its planning in such a way that the above 
mentioned competencies can be maintained. 
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Regarding the other areas of competence, the government states the following: 
Other competence can also be vital for the defense forces. But acquisition 
shall always be made with international competition. Performance, quality, 
life cycle cost, and proposed offset should be the basis for the final decision. 
International cooperation and export make it possible to maintain a broader 
industrial base. 
The document anticipates that: 
Sweden's membership in the European Union (since January 1995) may lead 
to a new relationship between defense industries, and... more cost effective 
system acquisition, for example through joint projects. In order to maintain 
the industry, Sweden will probably need to participate in the evolving 
cooperation between defense industries in Europe, in which Western 
European Armaments Group (WEAG) is an important forum.3 
D.       THE ARMED FORCES' POLICY REGARDING THE DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY 
From a strictly military point of view, the strength of the Armed Forces is more 
dependent on the types of weapon systems they possess and their capabilities than where 
they come from. From a political point of view, it is regarded equally important to be 
independent of other countries for defense equipment. Dependence could undermine the 
capability of the government to maintain a credible neutral, non-aligned stance. 
In the preparations for every defense resolution, the Supreme Commander proposes 
his defense plan for the next five years. In the plan for the period 1992 to 1997, the 
following guidelines were proposed regarding domestic industrial capabilities. It states that 
Sweden must be able to: 
• Use and maintain existing systems without foreign support. 
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• Maintain independent capability in areas that other countries regulate or protect. 
• Ensure deliveries and timely mobilization in times of blockade, crisis or war. 
• Stay at the forefront of technology and remain an interesting partner in 
international cooperation projects, thereby gaining access to technology which 
would otherwise be unavailable.4 
In a downsizing situation, these are the industry capabilities the Armed Forces would 
try to maintain as long as possible. As can be seen, they do not differ from the government's 
view. 
E.        THE ARMED FORCES' TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY 
The Supreme Commander has also initiated work regarding a strategy for 
classification and prioritizing of key defense technologies. This work is not yet complete, 
but a 1994 draft offers a prioritized classification of the technologies or capabilities to retain 
in the defense industrial base: 
A. Technologies with strategic importance for the Swedish Armed Forces which are 
unobtainable through cooperation with domestic or foreign civilian industry. 
B. Defense technologies closely linked with other technologies that offer highly 
leveraged opportunities in R&D, production or easy modification of systems. 
Especially interesting are technologies that can give higher performance, lower 
cost or higher quality. 
C. Niche technologies in which Sweden has world class capability and is attractive 
to others for international cooperation. 
D. So-called "promising technology" that can give new opportunities in a longer 
perspective. 
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E. Technologies that can improve the work processes inside the defense industry 
or the defense forces; for example, system technology, production technology 
or simulation and modeling.5 
These priorities are in line with the policies presented earlier. 
F.        FOREIGN DEPENDENCE 
As seen in the previous, foreign dependence is something Sweden and the Armed 
Forces have to live with and accept. Both in the cases of international cooperation and 
concentration in niche areas, there will be more foreign dependence. In the first case, this 
is due to the linkage with foreign firms. In the second case, more products have to be bought 
from foreign suppliers. Thus, it is necessary to look at the current Swedish policy regarding 
foreign dependence. 
1. Background to Foreign Dependence 
It is not economically possible for a country with less than nine million people and 
a 6 billion USD defense budget to produce all necessary components domestically. The 
Swedish defense industry is already, like most civilian industries, dependent on foreign 
industries. The import of knowledge, licenses, components and subsystems is inevitable. 
Foreign dependence has therefore been accepted both by the government and the 
Armed Forces. The dependence can take different forms. Perhaps the most common is that 
the Swedish defense industry buys components or subsystems abroad and uses them in the 
development and production of weapon systems in Sweden. Another form of dependence 
is when the Swedish Armed Forces buys whole systems directly from a foreign supplier. 
The trend is towards increasing use of foreign produced components and subsystems. An 
analysis of the reasons for Swedish acceptance of the current level of foreign dependence 
should include the following elements: 
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• Domestic demand is not sufficient to support a defense industrial base covering 
all areas. 
• Lower costs: By using components produced in large quantities abroad, costs can 
be minimized. No domestic research or development is needed. 
• By using the world market, the industry will in some cases get access to better 
technology than what is available domestically. 
• An open and competitive market offers significant risk reduction. A case-by-case 
analysis can identify procurement candidates offering minimum risk. 
• Many components are almost commodity items, implying a ready access to 
substitutes. The wise choice is selective dependency in areas where that is the 
case. 
• Corporate globalization is accepted in Sweden as a fact of the contemporary 
marketplace. It is hard to tell which country actually "owns" a company, since all 
big ones are multinational and located in a number of countries. 
• The perception is that there will probably be a period of increased tension in the 
world before a big conflict starts. This "reaction" time can be used to offset the 
dependency. 
2. Risks Involved 
The assumptions underlying the official view of the risks of foreign dependence are 
constantly re-evaluated and debated. An area where the Armed Forces tend to take a more 
cautious attitude than the government is the possibility of increasing production or 
procurement from abroad in times of crises. Studies have been conducted by the Armed 
Forces and the Defense Research Administration, regarding the possibilities to do so. They 
looked at two scenarios. 
First, if slowly increasing tensions allow a period of years before the crisis point, then 
it is possible to speed up and increase ongoing production of certain systems and acquire 
systems from abroad.   It is also possible to domestically modify and improve existing 
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systems by changing or upgrading electronics and software. An important determinant of 
success is the access to imported components and subsystems. 
The second scenario allows much less warning before the crisis point. In this case 
of rapidly increasing tension in the world and a new arms race, there can obviously be 
problems in acquiring advanced weapon systems, especially for a small neutral country. In 
situations where access to foreign components becomes restricted, domestic capability to 
respond to production requirements is uncertain. Due to this uncertainty, the studies suggest 
that the possibility of increased production should not be considered as a viable option in the 
overall defense planning or in the prioritization of industrial competencies. An increased use 
of civilian (dual-use) components may increase the possibility for forced production since 
availability will be greater. 
In either case, a domestic defense industry, with a long tradition of international 
cooperation in times of peace, is far more likely to retain those mutually beneficial 
relationships during times of crisis. 
3.        Reducing the Risks 
Until recently, the aim has been to reduce, or at least not increase, the level of foreign 
dependence. This has been accomplished by increasing the number of suppliers in order to 
avoid heavy dependence on one or a few companies. Adequate spares have been acquired, 
and Sweden has always built up the capacity to maintain its weapon systems without foreign 
technical assistance. Now, steps are taken to form clear policy guidelines that can be used 
to carefully assess each case and make a decision regarding the risks involved. Clear policy 
guidelines are needed in this area. A complicating factor is the hidden dependencies inherent 
in large systems containing sub-components which contain sub-components and so on. 
With regard to foreign ownership of Swedish defense industries, current policy 
requires the government to examine and approve any transaction which may lead to foreign 
ownership of 50% or more of the company.  The government must decide in each case. 
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Finally, an essential element of any risk reduction plan is to maintain a stand-alone domestic 
industrial capability in the most critical areas. In those instances of great risk for 
dependence, or an even greater risk of restricted access to foreign technology, competence 
has been maintained. 
G.       EXPORT REGULATIONS 
Swedish arms export is prohibited by law. However, the government can give 
permission on a case by case basis. The law also states that the government decides what is 
to be considered "equipment for warfare". In simple terms, this means that Swedish industry 
can not export to a country: 
• in armed conflict with another country. 
• involved in an international conflict that can lead to an armed conflict. 
• that has internal instability. 
• that violates human rights.6 
These strict rules limit the number of countries that the Swedish defense industry is 
able to export to. And in an effort to make the rules even harder, there is strong pressure from 
different groups to forbid arms export to all but neutral countries. The following statement 
from Jane's Defence Weekly 1994 is an example. 
Sweden's Minister of Foreign Trade, Mats Hellstrom, has said that the new 
Social Democrat Government will restrict sales of weapons to the Gulf states. 
The move follows pressure by peace groups that claimed the Swedish defense 
industry was trying to expand sales in the area to compensate for the lack of 
orders at home. Hellstrom told Parliament that the restriction was in response 
to the "current security situation in the Middle East".7 
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H.        COMMITTEE PROPOSAL FOR 1996 DEFENSE DECISION 
The parliament and government decide the overall security policy including defense 
policy. They also set the goals for the defense, as well as the economy. This is normally 
reviewed every five years when an overall defense decision is made. In preparation for the 
decision, the government forms a committee consisting of politicians from all parties 
represented in the parliament. It is important to note that the representatives from the 
Conservative and the Liberal party did not participate in the work this year, since the 
instructions from the defense minister prohibited the committee to study alternatives 
involving participating in the European defense cooperation (WEU) or NATO. This is a 
unique situation, and it shows how inflammatory this question is in domestic politics. 
In order to get the complete picture, it is important to realize there are other factors 
influencing the government's defense policy. It is not only the new strategic situation that 
lies behind the proposed cuts in defense spending. It is also the severity of Swedish 
economic problems. At a time when the welfare state has a huge budget deficit and a fast 
growing national debt, lower defense spending will meet little resistance in Parliament. 
Following are some important statements and conclusions from the 1995 Defense 
Committee proposal, presented on May 23,1995 and September 1,1995. It forms the basis 
for the parliament decision expected in 1996 (translated from Swedish): 
1. Environment 
The strategic and geopolitical conditions have changed dramatically in the 
Baltic Sea area. (See Figure 3) [The breakup of the Soviet Union into smaller 
states means that..] Russia's contact with the Baltic Sea is now limited to the 
inner parts of the Gulf of Finland and the Kaliningrad area...8 
The capacity for an invasion over water no longer exists. Most of the units 
that earlier constituted the base for this capability are no longer operational 
or are nonexistent. A rebuilding of the [Russian] capability to accomplish a 
large coastal invasion in the Baltic Sea area must start from a low level, and 
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with new geographical conditions. Such a rebuilding would seem to be hard 
to accomplish in less than ten years. It would also be very hard to do without 
the world noticing it.9 
Contrary to the Baltic Sea Area, the strategic and geopolitical situation in the 
northern part of Scandinavia is basically unchanged. As a result of 
developments in the nuclear arena, the area's strategic importance might even 
increase. 10 
NORWAY 
Figure 3. Scandinavia. 
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The military component has less importance in the relationship between the 
East and West, but is still a factor in some regional instances..." 
Russia will, during the foreseeable future, still be a society with great 
resources and many differences from the Western World, for example in 
economic and social development and political traditions. The 
adaption/conversion problems that Russia is going through, and 
accompanying political instability, mean that Russia during the foreseeable 
future will remain an uncertain factor in Europe and in the Scandinavian 
region. It should particularly be pointed out that the instability in itself can 
pose a threat, by a sense of public humiliation and revanchism that may lead 
to an authoritative regime with an aggressive and unpredictable foreign 
policy.12 
2. Swedish Implications 
The general security development in Europe has been favorable for Sweden. 
Armed aggression threatening Sweden appears very unlikely. In addition, the 
military capabilities to accomplish such operations will for a long time be 
highly limited. This is especially true regarding coastal invasion.13 
The demands on the armed forces' capability to meet such aggressions will 
thus be limited for a number of years to come.14 
If a threatening situation should occur in the near future, it is reasonable to 
believe that there will be considerable warning. However, it can be hard to 
draw the correct conclusions from other nations' intentions and preparations. 
As a consequence, the armed forces must maintain an adaptive capability to 
be able to meet the threats towards our sovereignty that could rise in the 
current military strategic situation.15 
Even though we presently have little reason to anticipate a military 
aggression towards our country ... we must as a non-aligned nation have a 
reassuring domestic military capability. The Swedish defense must have the 
ability to subsequently adapt to changes in the international environment. No 
nation should have a reason to doubt Sweden's will and capability to defend 
its territory against aggression....16 
The defense policy's credibility and security value is strengthened by close 
ties to the public. The basis for this relationship is the total defense concept 
comprising the whole society and a compulsory national service. Thus, a 
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capability to meet different threats is created, which forms the foundation for 
the public to defend its freedom and put up resistance in every possible legal 
way.17 
3. Conclusions 
The Swedish "total defense" [concept, effort and organization] is due for 
reform. Security developments in our part of the world offer new possibilities 
and pose new demands. The committee proposes a sweeping reform, aiming 
to create a total defense well adapted to short and long term political 
developments.18 
Because the threat in the short term is limited, and the development of new 
threats is considered detectable and time consuming, it is, according to the 
committee, appropriate to undertake certain reductions by limiting the total 
defense [smaller and less costly] and to reduce readiness in the short term. 
However, a definite prerequisite is that a simultaneous and thoroughly 
planned ability is preserved so that, if necessary, capability can be increased 
swiftly. Thus, the current organization must have sufficient flexibility to 
adapt the defense to a future development. The bottom line - the emphasis 
should be based on a philosophy of adaptability.19 
The Swedish non-aligned policy will continue. Sweden joining NATO and/or 
WEU would not aid Swedish security policy interests, nor provide stability 
in our part of the world. Therefore, it is essential for Swedish security that the 
total defense capability in the long term is on a level that allows a reassuring 
contribution to the stability in the Scandinavian area, and the capability to 
face threats to the country....20 
I. SUMMARY 
The multi-partisan committee proposal for the next defense resolution in 1996 
represents a significant cut in defense spending. In addition to the downsizing in 1992, it 
proposes an additional 25 % reduction of Army Brigades, Navy ships and Air Force 
squadrons (Figure 4). 
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The following statement by Supreme commander General Owe Wiktorin to Jane's 
Defence Weekly 1994, gives some insight into the military view of the proposed cuts. He 
said that the Swedish defense was already "scaled down to the bones" and that major 
reductions would not allow the military to defend the country. Gen Wiktorin suggested cuts 
in the costly obligatory conscript service, but Defense Minister Thage G. Peterson told him 
to cut elsewhere, saying that Sweden's national service is a democratic institution.21 
The cuts will most certainly have implications on the defense industry. The ability 
to provide the armed forces with modern and effective weapon systems is an essential part 
of the defense policy. The systems can be provided from a number of different sources; in 
each case a choice must be made whether to buy from the domestic industry, develop the 
system in cooperation with foreign industry or buy directly from a foreign nation. 
Previously, a large portion of the procurement has been made from the Swedish 
defense industry. The procurement budget has been big enough to sustain a broad and 
competitive defense industry. However, changes in the world security situation, especially 
in our region, are having a great impact on the conditions for the future of the Swedish 
defense industry. A smaller defense force, a smaller defense budget, and more complex and 
expensive weapon systems, create a completely new environment. 
When the time span between orders increases and the number of systems ordered 
decreases, the costs of maintaining domestic industrial capacity rise. The demand for cost 
effective system acquisition may lead to lost domestic capacity. In order to reduce this risk, 
the government and the Armed Forces are trying to develop a long-term strategy aimed at 
maintaining the most critical capabilities. This situation is not unique for Sweden, as most 
other countries are facing the same problems. The intention of the Armed Forces is to give 
clear signals regarding future needs, and by doing so create the conditions for the defense 
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Figure 4. Reduction of the Armed Forces. 
Despite these challenges, it is important to note that both the government and the 
Armed Forces still regard domestic capability as essential. Both have presented what they 
believe is essential for the future and what domestic capabilities must be maintained. An 
example of the consensus of government and armed forces with respect to the importance 
of domestic capability is that, only weeks after the committee presented its proposal, some 
committee representatives expressed worries. They feared that the cuts would affect 
acquisition programs too much. In order to bring clarity, the committee decided that the 
consequences to the domestic defense industry should be investigated, and the results 
presented to the government before the decision is made in 1996. 
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In summary, the Swedish Defense Industry faces the following challenges: 
• Fewer Swedish defense contracts. The government has stated that there will be 
at least a 10% budget reduction. Some programs or systems, especially those 
developed to defend against coastal invasion, face an increased risk of 
termination. 
• Fewer export contracts. The new world order has created an over-capacity in arms 
production. Although some countries may maintain or even raise their defense 
expenses, the total market will shrink. Meanwhile new competitors will enter the 
market. 
• Rising R&D costs. Weapon systems will become more and more "high tech"; 
costs will continue to rise, smaller numbers mean higher per unit costs. 
• A restrictive export regulation. Despite the shrinking market, a more liberal and 
aggressive export policy supported by the government could increase exports. 
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VI. INDUSTRY RESPONSE 
In what ways can the Swedish Defense Industry achieve some rational response to 
the challenges presented earlier? This chapter will look into some available responses and 
strategies of companies involved in production of military systems. Three different 
strategies, synthesized from prevailing trends, will be presented and discussed as possible 
approaches to the new environment. Recent developments will also be presented as well as 
advantages and disadvantages for each alternative. 
These strategies should not be considered as the only possible solutions. Each could 
vary in detail. Nor must they be implemented separately from each other. But in the 
discussion and for the comparison purposes in this study, they will be considered as separate. 
A.   BACKGROUND 
As presented earlier, the Swedish Defense Industry must most likely take action to 
remain competitive. The domestic customer base will no longer be large enough to sustain 
an industry of current size. This has been a developing process, and is well known by both 
the government and the Armed Forces. In order to offset the impact of the declining military 
funding, both the government and the Armed Forces have encouraged initiatives from the 
defense industry itself on how to deal with the current situation. By delivering clear 
priorities and a picture of how the largest customer will act, they are trying to simplify the 
change process. 
The strategies used in this research are all industry-initiated. Although some may 
need government support initially, government interventions or subsidies are not considered 
in this research. It is the government's view, at least officially, that subsidies directed 
towards the defense industry are not affordable. If the government wants to intervene there 
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are other possibilities. The government may, in an attempt to strengthen parts of the industry, 
direct the Armed Forces to develop and acquire certain weapon systems which the Armed 
Forces might not have selected if they had the possibility to choose. 
As a background for the strategies, it is essential to understand some of the 
differences between the defense industry and other civilian manufacturers. It should be noted 
that these differences are not as big today as they were only five years ago. Table 1 
summarizes some differences between the two. 
Military Civilian 
Performance more important than cost Highly cost sensitive 
State of the art technology Off the shelf, keeping costs low 
Custom design Standardized, mass production 
Large, long term contracts Many customers, many orders 
Government regulations Much fewer regulations 
Table 1. Differences Between Military and Civilian Manufacturers.' 
There is another important difference between producers of military equipment and 
civilian companies. The defense market is regulated and often operating outside of, or 
without normal market conditions. When defense industries face a shrinking market, and as 
a result, increased competition, the companies are more limited in their pursuit of more 
customers. It is almost impossible for the defense industry as a group to influence the 
demand for weapon systems. Since the companies are very dependent on the domestic 
market, and have difficulty expanding or creating new markets, the only realistic solution is 
to take customers away from someone else. 
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B.        ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES 
From the trends presented in Chapter IV, three main strategies can be derived. The 
approaches presented here have already been used worldwide and also to some degree in 
Sweden, as some examples will show. The alternative strategies that will be used in this 
study are: 
1. International Cooperation Strategy 
This strategy gains access to a larger customer base and more capital through 
agreements with defense industries in other countries (partners). Shared risks and longer 
production runs are other benefits. As a result of specialization inside the joint project, R&D 
and production may in part move abroad, but the Swedish industrial base remains relatively 
intact. For example: SAAB's agreement with British Aerospace regarding marketing and 
possible coproduction of the JAS 39 Gripen. 
2. Consolidation and Concentration Strategy 
This strategy emphasizes consolidation and concentration on a defense market niche, 
where the industry is, or can become, "world class" in an attempt to gain a competitive 
advantage over the competitors. The company expands only vertically and specializes on 
its core business and products. This study is limited to concentration in Sweden and the 
creation of national champions, consequently R&D and production will remain in Sweden. 
It gains access to a larger customer base through superior products. The strategy emphasizes 
cost-cutting measures, and it might also involve the acquisition of international competitors 
or sub-contractors. For example: Bofors specializes in developing and producing world class 
portable anti-tank weapons. 
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3. Integration and/or Conversion Strategy 
When utilizing this strategy the company wants to integrate military work with 
civilian work and/or expand into the civilian sector. New products will be added to increase 
the customer base and gain capital and knowledge for increased competitiveness in the 
defense market. This involves an increased use of civilian components and standards. R&D 
and production will mostly remain in Sweden. For example: Ericsson uses technology and 
knowledge from their military production when developing civilian communication systems. 
In the following each strategy will be presented and discussed in order to form a basis 
for the evaluation. Swedish examples will also be included 
C.        STRATEGY I: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
International cooperation is an important part of the globalization of the defense 
industry described in Chapter IV. It is an answer to the increased customer demand for more 
performance and complexity, leading to increased specialization, which at least for some 
companies requires an increased degree of cooperation. Cooperation with foreign industries 
may include all of the following areas: research, development, production, marketing, 
support, and subcontracting. 
One common form of international cooperation is codevelopment, in which 
companies jointly develop and produce a weapon system. For maximum benefits, it is 
desirable if this also includes cooperation between the different armed forces from the very 
beginning, when the requirements and specifications are decided. Cooperation normally also 
involves cost and benefit sharing over the whole life cycle of the system. Shared risks, costs 
and economies of scale are some of the benefits from codevelopment.2 
One problem involved is that it can be difficult for countries with different geography 
and force structure to agree on the same specifications. Such agreement often is a necessity 
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for obtaining maximum benefits. If the weapon system has to be developed and produced 
in different versions, most of the benefits from cooperation will not materialize. There is also 
a risk that parts of the research and development, as well as production, may move abroad 
due to specialization inside the joint company, thus limiting the benefits for the Swedish 
industry. 
Until the early 1980s, most of the codevelopment or coproduction agreements were 
based on government to government agreement.3 Normally, the governments also decided 
the work share for each country. This is not easy. It can lead to political disputes over each 
country's share. One example of this type of agreement is the five nation coproduction of 
the F-16 fighter. 
Today, industry to industry defense collaboration is dominant, while the government 
initiated cooperation has stagnated. Where the latter exists, it is often a result of offset 
agreements. The first examples of industry cooperation are joint venture companies, a 
subsidiary jointly owned and operated by two or more defense firms. Well known European 
examples are Eurocopter (Aerospatiale/DASA) and Euromissile (Aerospatiale/DASA). 
1. Swedish Examples 
Some of the benefits and problems involved with international cooperation for a 
Swedish defense company were described by Celsius president Olof Lund in Jane's Defence 
Weekly, October 3,1993. Close European defense cooperation is a top priority for Lund as 
a way of sharing R&D costs and expanding markets, but cross-ownership and cross-border 
mergers are unnecessary in Lund's view. 
Cross-border mergers are not so easy. It is much better to have very close 
cooperation, to be real partners and jointly develop a new product with 
special organizations for marketing to other countries, and not to have very 
complicated cross-ownerships. 
Our philosophy is that Celsius Industries is a public company and the 
component companies are 100 per cent owned by Celsius. This means we are 
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free to have joint ventures or cooperative agreements with any company. If 
we had a French, German or British company holding a part of Bofors, for 
example, we would probably be blocked if we wanted to have a cooperation 
with another company.4 
A number of international cooperation agreements and joint ventures are 
already established between Celsius and foreign firms. France's Giat 
Industries and Bofors will jointly develop the BONUS sensor-fuzed artillery 
round; CelsiusTech has a 50 per cent stake in a joint venture company, 
Singapore Engineering Software; and Kockums holds a 49 per cent interest 
in Australian Submarine Corp for the joint development and production of 
the new submarine for the Australian Navy.5 
The creation of joint venture companies is a solution also utilized by Swedish 
defense industry dornest: ally. The production of a new family of armored 
vehicles (CV 90) is made by HB Utveckling AB, which is owned by 
Hagglunds Vehicle and Bofors. Another Swedish example is the industry 
group producing the JAS 39 Gripen, IG JAS, which is owned by SAAB, 
Ericsson, Volvo, Celcius Tech and FFV.6 
D.        STRATEGY II: CONSOLIDATION AND CONCENTRATION 
This strategy emphasizes the core competence of the company as well as efficiency, 
thus creating a more specialized and competitive industry. By concentrating on its core 
competencies, the specialities that make the company unique, the firm strives to be among 
the best in the world. In pursuing this strategy, the firm also wants to drive the technology, 
to be at the forefront, and if possible outperform all competitors as well as discourage 
potential rivals. The goal is to obtain a strong, undisputed, stand-alone capability in one or 
a few technological areas in the military field. 
One way of achieving this leading position is transnational mergers or acquisitions, 
where defense industries actually buy or merge with each other in order to control the 
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market. This is a relatively recent phenomenon. Most of these mergers and acquisitions have 
taken place since the late 1980s. 
An important part of concentration is to focus on gaining market share and to 
abandon areas where the company is not competitive. Furthermore, it often involves internal 
consolidation. For big companies, one possible action might be to combine two production 
lines and close a facility. A more concentrated production arrangement is probably more 
efficient and can produce savings that can be used in more productive areas. Another 
essential part of the consolidation strategy is an investigation of all forms of cost cutting 
available to the company. Everything must be considered in the search for more competitive 
products, in order to deal with increased competition and decreasing defense budgets.7 
Available cost cutting measures include cutting research and development, selling 
plants, freezing wages, reducing capital spending, selling or closing divisions, or reducing 
employee benefits. Layoffs are often unavoidable since labor represents up to fifty percent 
of production costs in the defense industry. But there is a risk involved. The company might 
move from a technology driven industry to a cost driven industry in areas where it does not 
want to, and that would counteract the purpose.8 
Today there is visible evidence pointing towards concentration. Fifty-nine percent 
of U.S. companies in a 1995 Defense News survey of leading international defense firms 
responded that they are concentrating on their core business rather than trying to diversify. 
Forty-three percent of the companies expressed an interest in selling their noncore 
businesses. This trend puts pressure on smaller defense industries to either sell to a larger 
competitor, or buy other companies in order to grow.9 
The movement towards consolidation and concentration into fewer companies with 
fewer products is not without obstacles. One problem companies will face, especially if then- 
core competence deals with producing mostly classified products, is that the domestic market 
may not be big enough to sustain the company. Another obstacle that has been visible 
especially in the U.S. market, is the rapid rise in the price of defense stocks, which makes 
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acquisitions too expensive for many firms. The main reason for this stock price inflation is 
that most potential buyers are interested in the same type of industry - the electronics firms.10 
A Defense News survey in 1995 found that 70 % of U.S. defense companies are 
interested in making acquisitions, but only 43 % are interested in making divestitures of 
non-core businesses." 
1. European Development 
There is an ongoing consolidation debate in Europe regarding the future of its defense 
industrial base, and also its relations to the U.S. defense industry. Since the Swedish Defense 
Industry to a large extent is involved in those discussions, some recently presented views 
regarding European consolidation broadens the Swedish perspective. 
According to the international industrial consultant, Mike Price, Europe's defense 
industry executives need to follow a well defined route map to consolidation if their 
companies are to achieve world-class cost competitiveness. In a newly published report 
entitled "Defense Industry Consolidation - A European Perspective", Price outlines current 
consolidation trends and suggests how business managers should respond to them if they are 
not already doing so. According to the report, the consolidation she aid start with product-led 
consolidation on a national scale to create "National product champions". After this step the 
route map follows three subsequent phases: 
• Customer focused "National champions", (BAE, Celsius, Finmeccanica etc). 
• Product focused "European divisional champions", (Combat aircraft, etc). 
• Customer focused "European sector champions", (EuroAir, EuroSea etc). 
The report also states that cross border mergers are essential and that project-specific 
alliances that preserve national capabilities are out of date. National consolidation will not 
be enough - rationalization within Europe is required. Yet consolidation in Europe, along the 
lines of Lockheed and Martin Marietta, can not apply because of differing national interests, 
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military and foreign policies, employment and union laws and the like. The benefits that 
would accrue from this would include lower overhead cost, greater scope for exploiting 
regional centers of excellence, less competition, being on more equal terms with their U.S. 
counterparts, and higher financial rewards. The report concludes: "To rationalize defense 
production capacity in Europe, governments and industry will need to share this longer term 
•   • "12 vision. 
Therein lies the snag, since most countries still put national interest first and try to 
maintain domestic capability in many areas. This is, as presented in Chapter V, also true for 
Sweden. 
Another analyst, Pete Deighton, with Smith New Court Securities in London, 
presented similar thoughts July 27, 1995. "European companies are going to become less 
and less competitive against U.S. companies." He based this statement on the magnitude of 
the U.S. domestic market and the sheer size of U.S. defense companies as an important 
advantage, and also that the European companies must serve a market fragmented into a 
number of countries, inhibiting their ability to benefit from economies of scale. The many 
and diverse customers within Europe often result in work frequently divided for political 
reasons rather than for its cost effectiveness.13 
After these contributions to the debate, what is the current situation in Europe today? 
In Sweden Celsius controls a large part of the defense industrial base, while in Italy 
state-controlled Finmeccanica has an even more dominant position (+70%). A similar 
process is under way in both Britain and Germany, while the process is slow in France. 
Important factors determining the need for, or the speed of, the process are defense spending, 
world market developments and government policy. 
2.        Swedish Examples 
Between 1991 and 1993, Celsius acquired almost half of Sweden's defense industry: 
Bofors, FFV (Telub, FFV Aerotech) and Nobel Tech (now Celsius Tech). This move 
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followed a major review of the business and a decision to concentrate on high-technology 
military niche products.14 
Bofors has also restructured. It started after the company's merger with FFV 
Ordnance in 1990 when nearly 40 % of the workforce was cut. It has also prepositioned 
Bofors for achieving its strategic aim of being one of Europe's leading weapon systems 
manufacturers. Moving away from volume production, particularly in ammunition, Bofors 
is evolving into a niche technology company with core capabilities in missiles, "smart" 
munitions, anti-armor and air defense weapons and underwater systems. Determined to 
produce top of the line equipment, at least 15 % of turnover is reinvested in R&D, the aim 
also being to develop these capabilities to attract joint venture partners.15 
Capturing niche markets by focusing on a number of core technologies is a strategy 
shared by Celsius defense electronics arm, Celsius Tech, renamed after Celsius acquired 
Nobel Tech from Nobel Industries. Concentrating on airborne passive countermeasures, the 
Electronics Division's Sensors and Countermeasures unit has developed a new chaff 
dispenser range. Key export contracts have been won from the UK to equip RAF Harrier and 
Tornado aircraft. The U.S. Navy ordered 290 dispensers for its F-14 Tomcat fighter fleet.16 
SAAB has also taken a further step in focusing its defense businesses with the 
formation of SAAB Defense. Having split SAAB Military Aircraft from its civil airliner 
business to market the JAS 39 Gripen more effectively, the company has pulled together its 
defense activities into one unit. SAAB Defense brings together SAAB Military Aircraft, 
SAAB Missiles, SAAB Instruments and SAAB Training Systems, to form one unit. The 
focus of the unit is its JAS 39 fighter aircraft, new stand-off missile developments, a new 
medium range air-to-air missile, defense electronics and Optronics and training systems.17 
58 
E.        STRATEGY HI: INTEGRATION AND/OR CONVERSION 
This strategy includes two related approaches, which to different degrees try to 
maintain competitiveness, and also the ability to resurge in the case of increased threat, by 
relying more on commercial products, processes and buying practices. Integration tries to 
use the same technologies, personnel, administrative procedures, research, and production 
facilities for both military and civilian customers. Conversion is totally or in part moving 
over to civilian production and broadening the product base. The strategy's goal is to 
maintain or even increase the industrial base available for military production, but at the 
same time not be totally dependent on military customers. Other possible benefits include 
greater economies of scale, lower costs, and higher quality.18 Three expressions related to the 
benefits of integration and conversion are: 
• Spin-off: The non-defense commercial viability of technologies, components, and 
products already developed for defense purposes. 
• Dual-use: New technologies with both defense and commercial application. 
• Spin-on: The defense utility of existing non-defense, commercially viable 
technology, components and products with emphasis given to technologies that 
could improve the affordability of military systems.19 
Spin-off has been a factor in the defense debate for a long time. The latter two are 
more recent entries. One reason for this is that it would have been almost impossible to take 
some of these approaches only ten years ago. Up until now, defense technology has almost 
always been more advanced than its civilian equivalent. Today, however, civilian product 
technology is often more advanced, and production technologies have advanced to the point 
where integration is not only possible , but also desirable.20 
It is important to point out that there will still be a need for certain areas with specific 
defense-unique technology. But it does not necessarily mean that those products must be 
considered unique and be produced in an all-military industry.   When examining the 
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materials, components, and subsystems that the products are made up by, there are often 
commercial counterparts that are less costly, more advanced and capable of satisfying the 
same environmental conditions.21 
Increasing the integration between military and civilian industrial technology and 
production will lower overall defense costs, promote technology transfer, increase available 
industrial capacity and strengthen the economic dimensions of national security. The 
reductions in defense spending make civil-military integration all the more important. This 
is something that the governments now are realizing, and steps are being taken to move away 
from military specifications when possible and to make integration easier. 
There is a perception that defense technologies are unique because of the way the 
government procures them. Government regulation has, at least to some degree, prevented 
the industry from integrating military and civilian production. In general there are three main 
areas of regulation that create barriers to civilian-military integration: accounting 
requirements and audits, military specifications and standards, and unique contract 
requirements. To facilitate the move towards integration, the military must encourage this 
development by using new types of specifications allowing dual use. This might be 
especially helpful to those industries already having civilian production.22 
For this to be successful may also require the government to make some policy 
changes. First, it could review laws that tend to isolate the defense industries from the 
broader civilian base. Second, as previously mentioned, the Armed Forces need to accept 
commercial and international standards in place of military specifications. Third, a shift 
towards greater civil-military integration may require changes in the way research and 
development is carried out. The funding may have to shift from today's military unique 
R&D, towards research on dual-use technologies.23 
Two examples of areas that illustrate aspects of conversion are the emerging 
(European) Aerospace program and the need to rebuild former Eastern Europe. Also mass 
transit, communication, environmental cleanup and mine clearing are areas where military 
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producers may have some advantages. Developing new technologies and/or new products 
related to military products can be one possible way to broaden the product base and move 
closer to the civilian market. For example, new technologies can be used to track attempted 
smuggling, or illegal import/export of nuclear material. Developing new or improving 
existing sensors for detecting nuclear, biological and chemical smuggling might also be 
successful. 
Conversion will not be without obstacles. Successful defense conversion will depend 
on emerging new markets or the expansion of existing markets. Without them, 
defense-dependent firms must compete with, and their product displace those of, established 
suppliers. There are potential markets that may be able to make use of the existing defense 
technology. However, it is not clear if those markets will materialize, or are expanding 
sufficiently, or can ever be large enough to fully utilize the defense industries' capacity. Since 
there are already firms established in these markets, growth must be substantial to support 
new entrants. There is no guarantee for successful conversion.24 
A firm trying to enter a new market faces uncertainty regarding customers and 
requirements. A firm that is used to a one or few customer environment may have difficulty 
trying to understand new commercial markets, especially if they lack the necessary 
marketing skills and organization, including distribution networks for dealing with a broader, 
more dynamic customer base.25 
Another factor is the access to capital. The firms with the greatest need to convert are 
often the weakest financially, so they may encounter problems in the capital market. There 
are mainly two factors that are against them. They probably have declining defense sales and 
they are trying to compete in an unfamiliar market. They therefore will not usually command 
the highest credit rating.26 
There are also structural barriers for defense-dependent firms. The most fundamental 
structural difference is that the defense market has one dominating buyer, in this case the 
Swedish Armed Forces. Despite exports, the defense industry is mostly dependent on the 
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domestic market. Also, for any given defense product there is in most cases only one 
domestic supplier. Finally, the ultimate good being purchased (i.e. national defense) is public 
good that is difficult to price.27 
The defense market is often highly regulated, which leads to imperfect market 
conditions. For example, prices (and profits) are often determined by negotiation. To ensure 
a fair and reasonable price, the Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) checks accounting, 
cost and pricing data. The regulated nature of the market and special military specifications 
may have led to overhead costs that place defense industries that want to convert at a 
competitive disadvantage in the commercial market.28 
The difficulty of putting a price on national defense has in many cases allowed 
performance to dominate over price. Consequently, military technology has in some 
instances reached a level of costly sophistication for which the civilian sector may not be 
willing to pay. The complexity of military systems has led to a long development process 
favoring revolutionary, but slow, innovation. The defense industries have gotten used to 
research, design, development, and production cultures that may not function well in a more 
cost-conscious and dynamic market environment.29 Recent years' increased competition has 
put pressure on the industry. Today defense industries are forced to be more competitive. 
1. Swedish Examples 
This example from Jane's Defence Weekly, October 17,1994, shows both successful 
Swedish spin-on and spin-off, and how the military producer uses the civilian part of the 
company for its business. 
By luck or by judgement, telecommunications giant Ericsson has benefitted 
enormously from its defense arm, Ericsson Radar Electronics (ERE) - something which its 
President, Bengt Halse, will not let the parent company forget. "Other companies talk about 
using defence technologies in the commercial market, but we are actually doing it", said 
Halse. 
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The company employs less than four percent of its parent's total workforce but 
provides a significant R&D and technology base. Components and techniques developed 
for military applications have been successfully applied into the commercial market and then 
fed back to the military side. The Mini-Link microwave communications system is the prime 
example. Now established in the commercial market, the company has developed a military 
version of its Mini Link, the MF-15, using the advantages of commercial development. "A 
high growth rate is achievable because we have an unbeatable market distribution through 
our parent company," Halse added. 
Dual-use items are proving helpful in reminding the parent of the worth of a high 
technology defense arm, and ERE is sure they will continue to have support from higher up, 
even though shrinking defense budgets are forecasted. 
A downturn in technology spending would inevitably affect ERE since, although it 
exports around 50 % of its output, it has traditionally relied heavily on the Swedish 
government for development work. What may act in the company's favor, however, is the 
shift away from manpower solutions to technical ones.30 
F.        SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented possible industry-initiated strategies for the Swedish 
Defense Industry. Examples were used to exemplify the ongoing process. In the next 
chapter the strategies will be evaluated using the future needs of the Swedish Armed Forces. 
The strategies are shown in Table 2. 
I International Cooperation 
II Consolidation and Concentration 
III Integration and/or Conversion 
Table 2. Industrial Strategies for the Swedish Defense Industry. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to compare the alternative defense industry strategies 
in light of future Swedish military needs. Each strategy will be graded on how well it fulfills 
those needs. This methodology is suited to evaluate the degree to which each strategy fulfills 
the needs of Swedish government and Armed Forces. Regardless of the strategy selected, 
the defense industry will continue to be dependent on the domestic market. Although the 
methodology will not be able to predict which of the strategies will be most successful in the 
marketplace, it might provide an indication of the potential for marketplace success. 
Evaluation criteria for the comparison will be derived from the requirements of the 
Swedish defense, government policy, the role of the Armed Forces and the defense industry. 
To get a broader view, other scenarios which consider possible geopolitical developments 
will be investigated. The final selection of evaluation criteria will be based on government 
and Armed Forces priorities. 
It is important to point out that an individual company might choose a combination 
of strategies including strategies not mentioned here. But for the comparison the three 
strategies will be evaluated separately and not in combination. 
A.        GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES REQUIREMENTS 
From the government and Armed Forces policy presented in Chapter V, the following 
evaluation criteria can be derived: 
• Provide competitive systems for the Swedish Armed Forces 
• Support build-up and mobilization capability 
• Sustain a broad defense industrial base for later growth 
• Provide the Armed Forces with systems and technology unavailable from abroad 
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• Support and modify systems in inventory 
• Limit foreign dependence 
• Sustain competitive advantages in selected areas 
• Enable stand-alone capacity, where possible, with no need for government support 
B.        GEOPOLITICAL SCENARIOS 
The positive trend of a decreasing external threat upon which the government bases 
the defense downsizing may not continue. Other scenarios are possible. In an effort to 
maintain a flexible policy, some of these possible developments have been accounted for in 
the government and Armed Forces policy. The goal is to be able to adapt defense policy and 
defense readiness to the new threat, if the security situation changes. To understand the 
demands these scenarios might impose on Swedish defense, selected scenarios will be 
described, and relevant evaluation criteria derived. In some cases the evaluation criteria will 
be accounted for by government and Armed Forces policy. 
1. Scenario 1: Move from Neutrality Policy Toward WEU or NATO 
As a result of the ongoing changes in Europe, and the fact that Sweden is a member 
of the European Union since January 1,1995, Sweden might reconsider its neutrality policy 
and apply for membership in NATO or WEU. From an official point of view, this is not a 
likely development. The non-alliance neutrality policy remains very important, since Sweden 
is a country in which neutrality is widely perceived as having held Swedes out of two world 
wars. It is only recently that the issue has even been debated. Wilhelm Agrell and other 
independent security analysts have said that Sweden "has in effect chosen its path" by 
entering the European Union (EU) and by joining NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994. 
"It is a deliberate twist of facts to claim we have a continued policy of neutrality", Agrell 
said.' 
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It is a fact that Sweden joined the EU without reservations about the block's plans for 
a joint foreign and security policy. Sweden also has applied for observer status in the 
Western European Union, the EU's embryo to a joint European defense.2 If a membership 
in either WEU or NATO would be a reality, new demands would be put upon the Swedish 
Defense Industry. The following evaluation criteria can be derived from this scenario: 
• Support force integration with the alliance 
• Participate in foreign cooperation projects 
• Modify existing systems to new standards 
• Maintain high competence in selected technologies to make Swedish industry an 
attractive business partner 
• Maintain and support other nations' equipment 
2. Scenario 2: New Tension in Former Soviet Union; Increased Risk for 
Invasion 
From a Scandinavian point of view, the "threat spectrum" in Europe has radically 
changed. It is yet too early to determine if it is going to develop toward stability or 
uncertainty. The pattern of security and military strategy in Northern Europe is rapidly 
changing. There is consequently a great amount of uncertainty. One possible outcome is that 
a more aggressive government comes to power in Russia, and a new "anti- western policy" 
will dominate. Tensions would rise, and there would be an increased risk of military 
confrontation. The following evaluation criteria can be derived from this scenario: 
• Responsiveness, capability for increased production 
• Support rapid build-up and mobilization 
• Modification (improvement) of existing systems 
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• Rapid development of new weapon systems 
3. Scenario 3: Non-military Threats 
An increasing number of politicians argue that the old way of looking at the outside 
world cannot be limited to the risk of military attack against Sweden. The expanded concept 
of "a threat spectrum" must be extended to comprise situations in which in the Swedish 
Armed Forces could be called upon to play a part in a Scandinavian or European action. Such 
situations might include new security policy structures and new actors responding to 
economic conditions, ethnic and religious conflicts, international crime and terrorism, 
refugees and environmental threats or catastrophes which affect security to a greater extent 
than before. The following evaluation criteria can be derived from this scenario: 
• Capability and flexibility to produce new products 
• Ability to convert civilian products 
• Ability to convert military products 
• Ability to destroy old weapons in an environmentally safe manner 
• Capability to develop and produce new non-lethal peace-keeping weapons 
C.        SELECTION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Of all requirements presented, six criteria have been chosen to be used in the 
comparison (See Table 3). It is important to stress that these criteria are subjectively selected 
by this researcher, bounded by government guidelines set for the Armed Forces and 
indirectly for the Swedish Defense Industry, but also taking into consideration reasonable 
alternative scenarios. The comparisons are not an exhaustive attempt to give the right or best 
solution.    Rather, this comparison should be viewed as a tool for evaluating likely 
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I Provide competitive systems for the 
Swedish Armed Forces 
II Support build-up and mobilization 
III Sustain a broad defense industrial base 
for later growth 
IV Provide the Armed Forces with systems 
and technology unavailable from abroad 
V Support and modify systems in inventory 
VI Limit foreign dependence 
Table 3. Evaluation Criteria 
D. EVALUATION 
The three strategies will be evaluated using the different evaluation criteria chosen. 
Three different ratings will be given, +(positive), o(neutral), or -(negative), depending on 
how well the strategy meets the criteria. Before each comparison of strategies, a short 
description of the criteria will be made. Table 4 on page 86 summarizes the results. 
1. Criteria I: Provide Competitive Systems for the Swedish Armed Forces 
a.        Description of Criteria 
For a variety of reasons, most of the equipment used by the Swedish Armed 
Forces is produced by the Swedish Defense Industry. In almost all areas, there has been a 
competitive domestic industry able to provide high quality systems at competitive prices. 
The defense industry has been able to do this since the defense budget has allowed the armed 
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forces to acquire new systems on a regular basis. Proposed new spending levels will no 
longer allow this luxury. The Armed Forces cannot continue to acquire new weapon systems 
at the current rate or over the whole spectrum of requirements for the Army, Navy and Air 
Force. Limited resources will allow fewer systems to be ordered. Time between major 
procurements will increase. It will also be necessary for the Armed Forces to prioritize 
requirements to ensure that high priority areas receive top of the line equipment, while other 
areas must fall behind. 
b.        Evaluation of Strategy 
(1) International Cooperation Strategy[+]. It is uncertain to what 
extent this strategy can be utilized by the different firms. However, a reasonable assumption 
is that a high percentage of Swedish defense manufacturers can, in some way or another, 
pursue this strategy. In this case, the strategy has a high probability of helping to sustain the 
continued business operations of Sweden's competitive industries. The main reasons are that 
cooperation and building connections with industries abroad results in lower costs and access 
to a larger market. Both factors contribute to increased sales. 
Despite this, the size of the domestic industry might decrease if 
disproportional development or production is moved abroad. Even so, individual Swedish 
industries can survive as a part of a larger multi-national organization. If a large percentage 
of the industrial base remains competitive in this new environment, Swedish industry will 
most probably be able to continue to develop and produce competitive systems for the 
Swedish Armed Forces, or at least produce Swedish versions of systems jointly developed. 
(2) Consolidation and Concentration Strategy [o].    Not all 
businesses can adopt this strategy. Many smaller and weaker companies will be weeded out. 
A reasonable prospect for success probably requires both a leading position in the world 
marketplace and a strong financial position. It is also helpful if the firm already dominates 
the niche in which it wishes to concentrate. Both technical sophistication and low production 
costs will be essential for most markets. Of course, most companies will be able to cut costs 
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in one way or another, but cost-cutting alone will not be enough.  As a result, there will 
probably only be a few industries capable of totally adapting to this strategy successfully. 
Except in cases of spectacular success in the international market, 
these companies will initially remain dependent upon the domestic market. So, in most 
cases, it will only be possible to be competitive in areas where the Swedish Armed Forces 
are able to continue to acquire new systems and support R&D. With fewer remaining 
companies, this strategy cannot maintain an industry capable of developing and producing 
systems for the Swedish Armed Forces in all requirement areas. The end result will be an 
increased number of systems acquired abroad, with fewer but top-of-the-line weapons 
produced in Sweden. 
(3) Integration and/or Conversion Strategy [o]. This is an approach 
open to most companies. The question is how far they can go in integrating civilian and 
military business structures. The potential will vary from company to company. A first step 
might involve integrating civilian components and processes into military production in 
order to become more competitive and increase the chance of winning orders. If the policy 
is taken further, new civilian products can be produced as a complement to current products 
or as a replacement for military orders. Not all companies could go this far, especially if the 
downturn in the military market has affected the financial strength of the company. 
If civilian production is successful while the outlook for military 
orders is slim, the company is probably best off concentrating on the civilian product and 
liquidating or converting military production. Successful integration requires the civilian 
part of the company to be not only successful, but also large enough to help the company 
survive between military orders. An additional consideration would be the firm's capability 
to support or conduct ongoing military and civilian R&D. 
The probable outcome of this strategy is that some companies will 
successfully adopt civilian processes and components and become more competitive in the 
military marketplace.   Other companies might add civilian products and diversify their 
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business, which also will make them more flexible, improving the chances for survival. 
Another possible outcome of more civilian applications in military systems might be that 
companies producing solely civilian products today could develop the flexibility to compete 
for military orders as well. Nevertheless, since a number of companies will not be able to 
successfully adopt this strategy, the strategy will not maintain an industrial base capable of 
developing and producing competitive systems for the Swedish Armed Forces in all 
requirement areas. 
2.        Criteria II: Support Build-up and Mobilization 
a.        Description of Criteria 
In order to be able to support build-up in times of "unrest" or mobilization, 
the industry must be competent and knowledgeable as well as possess the facilities, 
components and personnel required to support production. The production facilities must 
also be located so that production and delivery of goods can be controlled or at least 
influenced by the Swedish government. No interdiction of delivery by military or political 
means would be acceptable. 
Two different types of production can be considered in a build-up or 
mobilization situation. One is production of relatively simple products (consumables), for 
example, small arms or artillery ammunition. The other is the production of more complex 
weapon systems. 
The first alternative is less complex and requires less lead time and is 
therefore more readily attainable, especially if the lead time (warning) is short. Contingency 
preparation during peace time could facilitate the start-up process and shorten the 
order-to-delivery time. On the other hand, the latter alternative would require greater lead 
time for successful implementation, due to the time required to get everything together for 
the production of a complex product. Unless the system is already in production, this time 
frame < Duld be two years or more. 
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Additional factors include the availability of necessary raw materiel, tools, 
components and subsystems. To overcome this problem, Sweden normally keeps an 
inventory of materials designated as essential. Another technique is to include stockpile 
requirements within key procurement contracts. 
In an attempt to reduce spending, the Swedish "total defense" concept has 
been dependent on support from the whole society (such as using peacetime commercial 
trucks as wartime military transports) and on delaying a selected procurement until hostilities 
appear to be imminent. The latter is known as prewar production, in which industry and the 
Armed Forces jointly plan for "surge" production only as the need arises. The government 
has mandated that certain lines of production, important for national security, must remain 
in Sweden and be ready to support the country on short notice. This applies not only to the 
defense industry, but also to many civilian companies. 
It is important to realize that the policies needed to achieve the goal of 
increased production might be in conflict with other necessary policies and therefore require 
tradeoffs. An industry that has reduced excess capacity to promote efficient peacetime 
production may have consequently limited its ability to meet surge requirements.3 Relying 
on surge production of materiel when needed avoids the costs of manufacturing (buying) and 
stockpiling, but entails investment in excess production capacity and thus lowers the 
efficiency of the peacetime production base. Stockpiled military materiel has the advantage 
of being immediately available, but carries manufacturing (buying) and storage costs. It may 
also become obsolete before it is needed.4 
b.        Evaluation of Strategy 
(1) International Cooperation Strategy [+]. This strategy retains 
most of the competitive Swedish businesses, with at least parts of the industrial base still 
located in Sweden. Thus, a domestic base for production and technical support remains to 
support "prewar production" requirement. It is also reasonable to believe that subcontractors 
will be located in the country and they, as well, would retain the capacity to play an 
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important role. An important consideration is where the production facilities are located. 
If they are in Sweden, production can be maintained or even increased, at least as long as the 
supply of components lasts. But there might be drawbacks. In a situation where most of the 
production facilities are located abroad, the Swedish share of the company is limited, or the 
demand for the products is high in other owner countries, Swedish access to production 
capacity in times of need could conceivably be limited. However, ccess will inevitably be 
better among cooperative partners with an established relationship than it would be between 
a dependent Sweden and a sole-source foreign provider. 
(2) Consolidation and Concentration Strategy [o]. The few 
remaining companies successfully utilizing this strategy will most certainly be able to 
support a build-up or mobilization, at least in their areas of competence, since the definition 
of concentration in this context includes production facilities physically located in Sweden. 
In times of crisis requiring prewar production, some production lines will be able to support 
build-up and mobilization while maintaining exports. Other lines will only be able to 
support domestic requirements. However, in areas in which basic capacity has been lost, it 
will be difficult or even impossible to obtain necessary support. 
(3) Integration and/or Conversion Strategy [o]. If the integration 
has been successful, the company has preserved an expertise and production facility base 
capable of manufactu ... ng military products. It is likely that in some cases, full-system 
production competence will be impaired, but an ability to produce parts or sub-systems can 
still be very valuable. This strategy also gives the industry an increased flexibility. In the 
areas where the competence is sustained, the ability to support build-up and mobilization is 
good. For areas in which military production capability is lost, the industry might be flexible 
enough to support the build-up with (modified) civilian components or products. 
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3.        Criteria III: Sustain a Broad Defense Industrial Base for Later Growth 
a. Description of Criteria 
The growth concept has been introduced by the government in the debate over 
the downsizing of the Armed Forces. The government's viewpoint is that the time available 
from the first signs of unrest to the outbreak of war will provide ample time to increase the 
strength of the Armed Forces, both through systems acquisition and refresher training. 
The Armed Forces, facing the fact of the growth concept, are fighting for a 
funding level sufficient to maintain all vital areas of the defense industry (the broad base). 
A preservation of these vital areas is necessary if the concept is to have any prospect of 
success. The Armed Forces' position is that, in order for the growth strategy to be successful, 
some basic requirements must be fulfilled. There must be an existing and competent 
industrial base to grow from, and it must be able to provide sufficient support within the 
available time frame. The Armed Forces must also be able to acquire and use a limited 
number of modern systems in all relevant areas, to permit officers to train and develop tactics 
for their use. 
b. Evaluation of Strategy 
(1) International Cooperation Strategy [ +]. One of the positive 
outcomes of international cooperation is that it is likely to preserve a relatively broad 
domestic industrial base. This fits nicely into the requirements for later growth, even if the 
capacity is not initially sufficient. A possible drawback might be that domestic competence 
may have decreased in some areas due to specialization inside the new joint company. There 
is a good chance this strategy will maintain a broad base. 
(2) Consolidation and Concentration Strategy [-]. In the case of 
concentration, with only a few highly competitive companies left, the result will be the 
opposite from the case with international cooperation. The defense industrial base will only 
consist of a few surviving industries. Even though the competence level might be high, there 
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will not be a broad base available to build from. The need for build up in the uncovered 
areas will remain, but there will be no fast domestic solution available. The competence is 
lost. As a result, this strategy will not maintain a broad base. 
(3) Integration and/or Conversion Strategy [o]. If this strategy is 
chosen, there is a high probability that, even if not all industries continue to produce military 
products, some military competence will still remain in the diversified companies (which 
may be used in the civilian production). For a few firms in which the integration has been 
successful, the company has preserved both knowledge and production facilities capable of 
producing both civilian and military products. It is likely this strategy will be able to 
maintain a relatively broad base, though with varying degree of military competence. The 
companies may not be as competent as the leading military producers, but it still is a base 
upon which to build. 
4. Criteria IV: Provide the Armed Forces with Systems and Technology 
Unavailable from Abroad 
a.        Description of Criteria 
One of the most important tasks for the Swedish Defense Industry has been 
to sustain an industry capacity to develop and produce weapon systems which other countries 
safeguard or impose tight restrictions on. This has often been the case in the areas of sensors, 
encryption, seekers, communication equipment and the like. This domestic capability has 
made it possible for the Armed Forces to field systems different from those used by the super 
powers. Most NATO and Warsaw Pact equipment was developed to target each other's 
systems. Swedish equipment, on the other hand, has been developed to operate against a 
broader variety of threats - often using unique technology - and offers clear defensive 
advantages in this regard. 
Up until now, the Swedish industry has been able to provide the Swedish 
Armed Forces with domestically developed systems in most of these areas. There is a risk 
78 
this will no longer be the case. The Armed Forces regards domestic competence in these 
areas as essential, since the modern battlefield requires top-of-the-line equipment in these 
high technology areas. Countries forced to rely on foreign systems face not only the risk of 
getting second rate, degraded export versions, but also the possibility of getting no 
equipment at all. 
b.        Evaluation of Strategy 
(1) International Cooperation Strategy [o]. There are a wide variety 
of opinions regarding technology transfer and the need for keeping certain technical expertise 
classified. One perspective is that industries from each participating country, in order to be 
"accepted" into a cooperation project, must contribute their core competence, the best they 
have, even if this earlier was regarded as classified. Another approach might be that some 
industries or countries will not engage in projects with other countries in areas they consider 
"sensitive". For either national security or competitive reasons, they want to withhold 
technical expertise. This is a complicated question for the Swedish defense industry, since 
it involves Sweden's special non-alliance situation and the limitations this might pose on the 
information flow in both directions. 
There might be instances where the industry wants to use a certain 
technology in a cooperation project as a way to gain access to a larger market. Many defense 
firms face this problem. It is easier to gain access to customers and capital in an alliance, in 
which more countries use the products. 
In cases where the domestic market is large or the company is 
supported by the government, the company has no need to export unique technology. The 
government and the Armed Forces might also oppose technology transfer in certain areas, 
because the military could be forced to change strategy or tactics when formerly secret 
systems become common knowledge. 
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Cooperation will keep more companies in business, but it is uncertain 
whether they will have the capability to specifically provide the Swedish Armed Forces with 
state of the art technology. Cooperation might render an increased transfer of technology 
into Swedish industry. At the same time, it will be harder to keep unique competence hidden 
from the partners, since that would be against the spirit of cooperation. To conclude, at least 
in some areas, the industry will probably lose the ability to provide the Swedish Armed 
Forces with unique state of the art technology unavailable from abroad. However, it will 
create better opportunities for the use of foreign technology. Cooperation provides an 
affordable but not a unique solution. 
(2) Consolidation and Concentration Strategy [+].   The few 
companies that successfully utilize this strategy will be in a good position to provide state 
of the art equipment. It might be the only strategy capable of developing the necessary 
competence inside a single company. One possible drawback is that it may be difficult to 
utilize this strategy for technologies a country wants to keep for itself. The basic theory 
behind concentration is to become world class, i.e. better than everybody else. From this 
leading position the company can increase the customer base and be able to stay ahead of the 
competition. If, in this case, the government decides that the technology or the products have 
a national security interest and therefore that the customer base must be limited, then the 
concentration strategy becomes difficult. One available solution is to use different software 
for export systems. Another way to build or si tain world class capacity under those 
circumstances is for the government or the Armed Forces to support continuous research and 
development in those industries considered vital to the national security. In some cases, this 
could be the only solution available for Sweden, but the support would likely be quite 
expensive. 
(3) Integration and/or Conversion Strategy [o]. The incredibly fast 
development in the technology sector, especially electronics, computers and 
communications, has in many cases lead to a situation in which the civilian technology is 
ahead of the military. In most of these areas, there is already a movement towards utilizing 
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the civilian technology in military applications. This strategy not only increases performance 
and shortens development time, but also lowers costs. This is clearly an area where a 
competent civilian industry might be able to provide the requested systems. 
The Ericsson company is an example of this potential. As presented 
earlier, Sweden has world class industries in the technology sector. It could be that Ericsson, 
due to its competence in the civilian sector, may be able to compete for systems for the 
military, even without having a military "division" maintaining continuous military research 
and development. This might not be possible in other areas, where for example more 
mechanical engineering is needed. 
Other alternatives must also be explored. Are there civilian 
applications for products that earlier have been all military? Scramblers for telephones and 
computers, communication systems, security systems - all have civilian applications, a fact 
which helps companies maintain dual competence. The companies choosing this strategy will 
be in a good position to make use of civilian "high tech," even if they do not possess it 
themselves. 
5. Criteria V: Support and Modify Systems in Inventory 
a.        Description of Criteria 
This is often stated as an absolute minimum requirement in both government 
and Armed Forces policy documents. Even in those cases where Sweden has acquired 
weapon systems abroad, it is considered very important to have the ability to support and 
maintain the systems without foreign support. The reason is to reduce foreign dependence, 
thereby ensuring the systems can be maintained in times of unrest or war, when foreign 
support may be disrupted or withheld. 
The Armed Forces have historically been able to rely on a broad competence 
in the domestic defense industry and some parts of the civilian sector as well. They have 
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benefitted from the fact that a broad domestic defense industrial base provides an easy 
capability to maintain and support similar or related systems. 
In cases where development or production competence cannot be sustained 
domestically there might be methods of maintaining enough competence for support and 
maintenance, perhaps by creating a specialized maintenance and support industry. The 
capability to rapidly upgrade software would be a specific example which would be 
applicable across a broad range of applications. 
However, there are at least three problems in attempting maintain a 
maintenance and support capability without an underlying industry base and R&D capability. 
First, for new technology, there could be a lack of existing related competencies and 
difficulty in acquiring the new competencies required for dissimilar systems. Second, for 
old technologies, there could be problems maintaining skill and spare parts, making support 
and maintenance quite expensive. Finally, since not all systems in the inventory are of 
Swedish origin (e.g., air-to-air missiles for the Air Force are almost entirely iöreign made), 
there could be restrictions on what the industry is allowed to do with the foreign technology. 
b.        Evaluation of Strategy 
(1) International Cooperation [+]. Although the size of the industry 
might decrease if parts of development or production move abroad, the company in question 
will most probably survive as a part of a larger organization. Since at least a part of the 
industry will survive and remain in Sweden, the ability to support and modify systems 
should also remain. There could also be advantages in having access to the resources of the 
larger organization or cooperative partners. Most certainly the Swedish companies involved 
in joint development, production and maintenance efforts will be able to maintain the 
expertise required to maintain and modify existing inventory items. Also, with the access 
to a larger market created by participation in joint efforts, some Swedish companies could 
concentrate on this specific task for that larger market, further enhancing domestic 
capabilities and contributing to the Swedish economy. 
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(2) Consolidation and Concentration Strategy [o]. There is one 
obvious risk involved with this strategy. Competence and skill can remain very high in some 
areas, and be lost in others. As a result of this strategy, parts of industry competence will 
inevitably be lost. The first losses would most likely be in the capacity to develop new 
systems. Later, the production capacity would be lost. Finally, the industry could in many 
cases lose even the competence to support existing systems. This would be the case when 
the company had to close down completely. 
One solution could be that one industry concentrates on support and 
builds competence in this area. It will have no competence in research and development of 
new systems, but instead a broad competence in support and maintenance. One question is 
if the Swedish inventory is large enough sustain a viable company. Another question is 
whether the field of support offers sufficient economies of scale and related functionalities 
across the broad range of air, land and sea weapon systems to be feasible. 
(3) Integration and/or Conversion Strategy [+]. The required 
technical level for being able to support and maintain existing systems is lower than the 
competence required to develop and produce new ones. This makes the integration approach 
especially suitable for this kind of work. A company moving towards civilian production 
could maintain the required competence level in the field of military maintenance and 
support relatively easily. This competence could be mutually beneficial to the field of 
maintenance and support in the civilian sector. Another possibility that could be a result of 
more civilian components in military systems is that industries working entirely in the 
civilian field could have the skill necessary to maintain certain military systems, especially 
those containing a relatively high amount of civilian components and technology. So, even 
if the industry fails to maintain the necessary skill for developing new systems, it will be able 
to support the systems in the inventory. 
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6. Criteria VI: Limit Foreign Dependence 
a.        Description of Criteria 
In today's market place, all countries must accept some degree of foreign 
dependence. Even U.S. industry faces this fact. The question is how much dependence the 
country will allow. Sweden has always had a degree of foreign dependence. The country's 
industrial base is too small to produce all necessary components and sub-systems 
domestically. As a consequence, the Swedish Defense Industry has become a very 
competent system builder, often using imported components to produce approximately 70 
% of the major weapon systems for the Swedish Armed Forces. 
However, as a result of decreased funding, Sweden faces a new challenge. 
Is it acceptable that products that always have been developed and produced in Sweden must 
now be procured abroad? The answer has not yet become clear. It is clear that Swedish 
government policy will attempt to maintain some degree of self sufficiency, especially in 
light of the neutrality policy. Furthermore, in future times of global crisis and mobilization, 
the declining defense infrastructure among major arms producers might leave no excess 
capacity for acquisition by a small country such as Sweden. As occurred in World War II, 
the larger countries might choose to restrict exports and retain all arms production for their 
own use. 
b.        Evaluation of Strategy 
(1) International Cooperation Strategy [o]. The cooperation 
strategy makes the Swedish Armed Forces more openly dependent on foreign sources, with 
regard to both the number of foreign companies involved and Swedish dependence on 
subcontractors abroad. On the other hand, cooperation makes products more affordable and 
increases the size of the export market. This will help the domestic industry to stay 
competitive and survive as a part of a larger organization. This strategy can be described as 
foreign dependence on countries Sweden has established good relationships with and can 
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trust. The Swedish Defense Industry will most probably be able to continue to develop and 
produce competitive systems for the Swedish Armed Forces, or at least produce Swedish 
versions of systems jointly developed. This reduces the need for acquisition from entirely 
foreign companies. 
(2) Consolidation and Concentration Strategy [o]. Under this 
strategy, some major weapon systems can still be bought from Swedish sources. Even 
though this strategy provides the greatest degree of independence from foreign sources for 
those Swedish companies that survive, it is important to note that even the survivors will be 
dependent, to some extent, on foreign sources for some materials and subcomponents. In 
cases where suppliers are incorporated in the company, this dependence will be significantly 
reduced. In other areas where Swedish companies cannot survive and domestic capacity is 
lost, weapon systems must be bought from abroad. There will be instances in which this 
procurement will not involve a Swedish company. In this case, the only possibility to 
reduce the dependence is to make an offset agreement. 
(3) Integration and/or Conversion Strategy [o]. Not all Swedish 
firms will be able to utilize this strategy successfully. There will be areas in which domestic 
capacity will be lost and systems must be bought from foreign suppliers without Swedish 
involvement, although these occurrences will be less common than in the case of the 
consolidation and concentration strategy. The positive side of this strategy is that some 
companies still will be able to participate as subcontractors to other defense industries. 
There is also a possibility that the increased use of civilian components will reduce 
dependence on foreign sources. 
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E. SUMMARY 
As expected, none of the strategies alone fulfills all "requirements." In some cases 









I. Provide Competitive 
Systems + 0 0 
II. Support Build-up 
and Mobilization + 0 0 
III. Sustain a Broad 
Defense Industrial 
Base 
+ - 0 
IV. Provide Classified 
Technology 0 + 0 
V. Support Systems in 
Inventory + 0 + 
VI. Limit Foreign 
Dependence 0 0 0 
Table 4. Summary 
International Cooperation Strategy's greatest advantage is that it probably will 
maintain a broad base of companies capable of providing competitive military systems for 
the Swedish Armed Forces and support build-up and mobilization. On the other hand, there 
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will be more foreign involvement. Thus, although there will be greater access to top of the 
line equipment, Swedish companies will not always be able to retain the stand-alone 
capability to domestically produce such equipment. This strategy has the best chance of 
maintaining current structure. 
Consolidation and Concentration Strategy will lead to the survival of a few highly 
qualified and competitive companies independent of foreign influence, capable of providing 
top of the line equipment for the Swedish Armed Forces in selected areas. For most 
companies, this approach is simply not possible, and competence will be lost. This strategy 
will in the areas of competence involve relatively few international firms, but it also poses 
the risk for depending on foreign sources for entire systems. 
Integration and/or Conversion Strategy could, if successfully implemented, lead to 
effective, fast acting and flexible companies. The strategy seeks to integrate civilian 
components and processes into the production, in order for the companies to become more 
competitive. New civilian products can be produced as a complement to current products 
or as a replacement for military orders. A positive outcome of this strategy is that some 
companies will successfully adopt civilian processes and components and become more 
competitive, thereby simultaneously reducing dependence upon and improving their 
capability to respond to Swedish military requirements. 
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This study has discussed the changed geopolitical context resulting from the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, and the new environment this development 
created for the world defense industry, especially in the case of Sweden. Despite these 
developments and a long history of declining defense spending, the Swedish defense budget 
has been able to sustain - up until now - a broad, world-class defense industry. 
The government proposal for the 1996 defense decision, with significant reductions 
in both the size of the Armed Forces and the defense budget, will affect both ongoing and 
planned acquisition programs. Since the defense industry, to a large extent, depends on the 
domestic market (70% of domestic military production goes to the Swedish Armed Forces), 
further reductions are likely to have a significant impact. Since there is no other market to 
readily absorb the excess production, it will be necessary for the defense industry to change 
and adapt to the new reality. 
There are two principal methods to deal with the situation. First, industry may 
initiate a variety of options to restructure itself. The other possibility is that the government 
initiates or subsidizes the restructuring process by supporting selected industries. This study 
was limited to the first approach. 
This study evaluated three different industry-initiated strategies using the future needs 
of the Swedish Armed Forces to establish comparison criteria. These needs are expressed 
in official documents published by both the government and the Armed Forces. Future needs 
have also been communicated to Swedish industry in an attempt to facilitate the restructuring 
process and to provide industry with a clear picture of its largest customer's future priorities. 
In response to this clear overall trend of declining spending, some measures have already 
been taken by the Swedish Defense Industry. As a result, there are today a number of 
ongoing efforts in the areas of international cooperation, consolidation and conversion. 
The outcome of the comparison of the strategies is summarized below: 
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A. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION STRATEGY 
• Is able to provide competitive systems in many areas 
• Is able to support build-up and mobilization 
• Maintains a broad industrial base 
• Is able to support systems in inventory 
• Creates known dependence and relationships 
• Gains access to a larger market, thus lowering costs 
• May increase specialization and foreign dependence 
• May not be able to provide unique/classified technical solutions 
• Will not consistently provide top-of-the-line stand-alone capability 
B. CONCENTRATION AND CONSOLIDATION STRATEGY 
• Maintains a few stand-alone, top-of-the-line companies 
• Is able to provide unique/classified technology 
• Reduces foreign dependence in selected areas 
• Increases efficiency and lowers production costs 
• Is able to support build-up and mobilization in selected areas 
• Is able to support systems in inventory in selected areas 
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• Creates increased foreign dependence in abandoned areas 
• Will not be able to provide competitive systems in all areas 
• Will not maintain a broad base 
C.        INTEGRATION AND/OR DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY 
• Is able to support systems in inventory 
• Maintains a relatively broad and flexible base for growth in most areas 
• Increases efficiency and lowers costs 
• Is able to support build-up and mobilization in most areas 
• May not be able to provide unique/classified technical solutions 
• Will not consistently provide top-of-the-line stand-alone capability 
• Is not applicable in all areas 
The evaluation shows that no strategy fulfills all requirements. International 
cooperation is the strategy that best meets the future needs of the Swedish Armed Forces. 
In addition, the international cooperation strategy contributes to shared costs, long 
production runs and a large customer base. This strategy provides the best opportunity to 
maintain a broad industrial base. Consequently, international cooperation is a necessary 
ingredient in the adapting process. If international cooperation can be achieved by 
simultaneously establishing a strong consolidated position, this combination strategy might 
prove even more successful by increasing Swedish industry's role in cooperative projects. 
Concentration, however, can only be successful in selected areas. These are areas 
which, at least over a transition period, need continuous domestic support. If this support 
comes in the unlikely form of sustained or additional government spending in support of key 
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research and development, there is strong potential for increased leverage for Swedish 
defense industry in the international marketplace and the resulting economic benefits. On 
the other hand, if this support must come from the existing defense budget, it is clear that the 
funds will be taken from existing priorities, with a resulting decline in the industrial base 
supporting those areas, and further subsequent repercussions throughout the Swedish 
economy. Nonetheless, concentration is the only strategy capable of providing stand-alone 
top-of-the-line technology and systems that other countries will not export. 
The importance of incorporating civilian technology and processes cannot be 
overstated. The integration and conversion strategy not only lowers costs, but gains access 
to new state-of-the-art technology, since civilian technology is often at the forefront. 
Moreover, the effort to counter new threats, such as international terrorism and smuggling, 
will offer opportunities for competent defense industries to develop new products for new 
markets. For certain firms the new market will be more vibrant than the military market and 
conversion would be the logical choice. This strategy alone cannot possibly preserve the 
entire defense industrial base and meet all Swedish defense requirements. However, the 
integration and conversion strategy improves efficiency as well as flexibility, and should be 
included as an important component of any overall strategy. 
The comparison also shows that each of the three strategies contains measures that 
would increase the companies' competitiveness in different ways. It is possible to increase 
international cooperation and at the same time move toward more civilian processes. It is 
also possible to seek international cooperation from a strong stand-alone position. Cost 
cutting can and must be made regardless of the strategy chosen, although cuts will be more 
severe in the case of consolidation, in which whole areas may be abandoned. 
No strategy eliminates foreign dependence. Dependence on foreign sources is 
inevitable due to the globalization of markets. The only choice to be made is between the 
two different types of dependency. International cooperation leads to a planned type of 
dependence which retains influence with joint partners in most areas. Consolidation may lead 
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to less dependence in selected areas, but greater dependence and total loss of leverage in 
areas where the competence is lost. 
After reviewing the results of the evaluation, it is obvious that Sweden faces a 
dilemma. The stakes are high. Not only jobs are at stake, but also one of the traditional 
cornerstones of Swedish defense policy, the self-sufficiency regarded as necessary to 
maintain a credible defense and true neutrality. The challenge is to maintain a broad defense 
industrial base while guaranteeing access through domestic availability to top-of-the-line 
military technology. This ideal is impossible given current spending levels. Priorities must 
be assigned, and the government must make the decisions. It is also necessary for the Armed 
Forces to participate in this process in order to make sure that the defense industry structure 
fulfills the Armed Forces needs. This decision process will be most difficult, but the 
information is absolutely necessary in order for the industry to choose the best strategy in the 
restructuring process. 
The Swedish Defense Industry must choose its own strategy to adapt to the new 
environment. The final overall strategy may include elements of all three strategies, but 
given foreseeable spending levels, it is impossible to pursue all three strategies 
simultaneously. It therefore falls on the government and the Armed Forces to "lay the 
ground rules" and clearly communicate future Armed Forces priorities and requirements. 
If this is done with an open and constructive dialogue, and skillfully managed by the industry 
and Armed Forces leadership, the Swedish Defense Industry will have all the necessary 
ingredients not only to survive, but also to thrive in the new environment, continuing to form 
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